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ON THE LAWFULNESS OF FORCEFUL REMEDIES
FOR VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS: "STAR WARS" AND
OTHER GLIMPSES AT THE FUTURE
RExJ. ZEDALIS*

Since March 23, 1983, when President Reagan announced his Administration'scommitment to a new generation of space-basedballistic missile defensive weapons, a national and internationaldebate has swirled
around the implications of the Strategic Defense hitiative (SDI). Some
have argued thatplacing defensive weapons in space will violate arms control agreements,particularlythe Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty. Professor Zedalis looks one step furtherand asks whether, given such a violation, the Soviet Union might be permitted under internationallaw to remove
forcefidly the components of the SDI system. In addition, Zedalis posits a
scenario in which the Soviet Union seeks to improve its strategicposture by
deploying anti-submarinewarfare (ASH') devices on the U.S. continental
shelf Assuming that this deployment violates the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conventions (as well as the pending 1982 Law of the Sea Convention),
Zedalis assesses whether the United States might bepermitted under international law to remove the ASW devices usingforce. To determine the validity
offorceful measures to remedy violations ofarms control agreements in general, Zedalis evaluates the contemporary vitality ofreprisalandantidpatoy
self-defense doctrines in light of the U.N. Charterand the agreements themselves. He concludes that although the right of anticipatoryself-defense remains legally viable, the right ofreprisalprobably is no longer valiL International law notwithstanding,Zedalisfinds some supportfor retainingcustomary law's right of reprisalas a policy option, particularlyin light of its
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possibly stabilizing effects in the strategic nuclear equation. Zedalis then
applies his legal and policy conclusions to the SDI scenario and the ASW
hypothetical in the context of strategic doctrine and the current and nearfuture profiles of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclearstockpiles.

I.

INTRODUCTION

What would happen if the United States began to deploy
components of the space-based ballistic missile defense
(BMD) system (known popularly as "Star Wars") currently
under consideration by the Reagan Administration?' Unless
the United States had previously exercised its right under
Article XV(2) of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty2 to
withdraw from the Treaty to protect "supreme interests,"
such a deployment would violate the Treaty's prohibition on
space-based BMD systems.a Would this violation of the
ABM Treaty then legitimate Soviet efforts to remove forcibly
the system's components?
What if Moscow, in order to add the United States' ballistic missile launching nuclear submarine force to the list of
strategic weapons already jeopardized by the destructive capability of Soviet strategic forces, placed a network of advanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) detection devices and
1. For a discussion of the "Star Wars" BMD system, see infra text accompanying notes 280-303. On space-based weapons technology, see D.
GRAHAM, THE NoN-NUCLEAR

DEFENSE OF CITIES: THE HIGH FRONTIER

SPACE-BASED DEFENSE AGAINST ICBM ATTACK 101-21 (1983); C. GRAY,
AMERICAN MILITARY SPACE POLICY 1-75 (1983); Burrows, Ballistic Missile
Defense: The Illusion of Security, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 843 (1984); Carter, BMD
Applications: Performanceand Limitations, in BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 17477 (A. Carter & D. Schwartz ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE]; Davis, Reactions and Perspectives, in BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, supra, at 382-84; Garwin, Reactions andPerspectives, in BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, supra, at 391-97; Garwin, Gottfried & Hafner, Antisatellite
Weapons, Sci. AM., June, 1984, at 45; Payne & Gray, Nuclear Policy and The
Defensive Transition, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 820 (1984); Thompson, "Directed Energy" Weapons and the Strategic Balance, 23 ORBIS: J. WORLD AFF. 697
(1970); Weiner, Systems and Technology, in BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE,
supra, at 91-97.
2. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM
Treaty].
3. See generally Meredith, The Legality of a High-Technology Missile Defense
System: the ABM and Outer Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418 (1984).
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weapons 4 on America's continental shelf? Such an undertaking might violate two of the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea
Conventions (the Continental Shelf and High Seas Conventions),5 as well as the pending 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.6 Would this violation of interna4. For a discussion of advanced ASW, see infra text accompanying
notes 350-69. On sea-based military technology, see Fiscal Year 1982 Arms
Control Impact Statements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations

and the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 352-78 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 ACIS]; Fiscal Year 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-18, 194-205 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 ACIS]; Evaluationof Fiscal ear 1979 Arms Control
Impact Statement Toward More Informed CongressionalParticipation in National
Secuity Policymaking: Hearings Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 ACIS];
K. TsipIs, TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ANTISUBb RINE WARFARE (1974); Antisubmarine Warfare, in STOCKHoLm INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., 1974 Y.B.
WORLD ARMAMENTS & DIs RAR ENT 303-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as

SIPRI 1974].
5. The two conventions are: Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958 [1964], 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,499

U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Continental Shelf Convention];
and Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958 [19621,
13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as
1958 High Seas Convention].

For arguments suggesting that this Soviet action would violate these
Conventions, see R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use of Another State's
Continental Shelf and International Law of the Sea (1985) (unpublished
manuscript; forthcoming in 16 Rutgers Law Journal) (available in the Author's file at the offices of the Journalof InternationalLaw and Politics, New

York University School of Law) [hereinafter cited as R. Zedalis, Foreign
State Military Use]; see also M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, TIE PUBUC ORDER

OF THE OCEANS 719, 724 (1962); Zedalis, MilitaryInstallations,Structures, and
Devices on the Continental Shef A Response, 75 AM. J. INTL L. 926 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Zedalis, Military Installations].

6. Third United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M.
1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].

For arguments suggesting that the hypothetical Soviet action would
violate this Convention, see Zedalis, Military Installations,supra note 5; R.
Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5.
The LOS Convention, supra, contains several provisions which may

prohibit military use of the continental shelf, including Articles 60, 80, 81.
86, 88, and 141. Article 60(1) states:
In the exclusive economic zone [and, under Article 80, on
the continental shelf], the coastal State shall have the exclusive
right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction,
operation and use of: (a) artificial islands ....(c) installations
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tional commitments justify United States attempts to remove
the Soviet ASW network?
and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights
of the coastal State in the zone.
Article 81 states: "The coastal State shall have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf [and, according to
Article 56(I)(c), in the exclusive economic zone] for all purposes."
Article 60(1)(a) and (c), and Article 81 make no exceptions for artificial islands, installations or structures, or drilling for military objectives.
That a coastal state's right is "exclusive" means that without a coastal
state's consent, a foreign state may not do anything included in any of
these provisions. For discussion of Article 60(1)(a) and (c), see Treves,
Military Installations, Structures and Devices on the Seabed, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
808, 840-41 (1980); R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5.
For a discussion of Article 81, see R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use,
supra note 5.
Articles 88 and 141 of the LOS Convention reserve the use of the
high seas and deep seabed for "peaceful purposes." Article 58(2) applies
the reservation of Article 88 to the exclusive economic zone, and Article
86 applies the same reservation to the continental shelf when it extends
beyond the economic zone. On the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in
the context of the LOS Convention, see Dore, InternationalLaw and the Preservation of the Ocean Space and Outer Space as Zones of Peace: Progress and
Problems, 15 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1, 21-24 (1982); Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 Am. J.
INT'L L. 57, 73 (1978); Zedalis, "Peaceful Purposes" and Other Relevant Provisions of the Revised Composite Negotiating Text: A ComparativeAnalysis of the Existing and the ProposedMilitary Regimefor the High Seas, 7 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L.
& COMM. 1, 18-20, 26-32 (1979).
Article 87 of the LOS Convention, though not explicitly addressing
the continental shelf, enumerates the freedoms applicable to the use of all
areas of the high seas. It states in paragraph 2: "These freedoms shall be
exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for
the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area."
(Emphasis added.) This provision may prohibit some military uses of the
areas subject to the high seas regime.
The 1958 Continental Shelf and High Seas Conventions, supra note 5,
do not contain provisions similar to Articles 60, 80, 81, 86, 88 and 141 of
the LOS Convention. Article 2 of the High Seas Convention does, however, employ a standard similar to the "due regard" standard of Article
87(2) of the LOS Convention. Article 2 enumerates the freedoms all
states may exercise, and then provides that "[t]hese freedoms, and others
which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall
be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interest of other
States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas." (Emphasis added.) See Treves, supra, at 851-52, on the effectiveness of the "reasonable
regard" standard in limiting military uses of high seas. In most situations,
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These questions are not unique to the ABM Treaty, the
1958 Continental Shelf and High Seas Conventions, or the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Several other international agreements prohibit certain military uses of transnational spatial areas, 7 and thereby present the bases for similar scenarios and questions. These agreements include the
Limited Test Ban Treaty,8 the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 9
military uses of the high seas are considered "reasonable." See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 5, at 753-63; Zedalis, Militay Uses of Ocean
Space and the Developing InternationalLaw of the Sea: An Analysis in the Context
of Peacetime ASW, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 575, 605-11 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Zedalis, Military Uses of Ocean Space].

With specific regard to the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (hereinafter the EEZ), neither the 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention nor the LOS Convention enunciates a "reasonable regard" or
"due consideration" standard applicable to conflicts of uses arising from
military activity. What standard applies under the LOS Convention, then,
if the military activity does not fall within Articles 60, 80, 81, 86, 88 or
141? Similarly, what standard applies under the 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention, which contains no provisions comparable to the articles of
the LOS Convention mentioned above? Some commentators have argued
that in such situations an implicit balancing test applies and prohibits the
initiation or continuation of certain military uses. See M. McDouGAL & W.
BuRKE, supra note 5, at 719-20, 724; Zedalis, Military Installations,supra note
5, at 928-29; R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5. The express provisions and the implicit balancing test discussed herein together
prohibit a wide range of,foreign state military activity conducted on another state's continental shelf and EEZ.
7. In this Article, "transnational spatial areas" includes the oceans
and the seabed beyond the territorial sea, polar zones, outer space, and
celestial bodies.
8. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No.
5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter cited as LTB Treaty]. The LTB Treaty
provides in Article I(I):
Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to
prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion,
or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under is jurisdiction
or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer
space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present ouside the territorial limits of the State
under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.
The effect of this language is to prohibit nuclear test explosions everywhere, including the oceans, the atmosphere, and outer space. The only
exception is for tests conducted underground. Even underground tests,
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the Outer Space Treaty,1 0 the Antarctic Treaty," and the
however, are prohibited if they cause "radioactive debris to be present
outside the territorial limits" of the conducting state. See generally Schwelb,
The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 642
(1964); X, Nuclear Test Ban Treaties, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 449 (1963).
The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II Agreement, June 18, 1979,
reprinted in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pun. No.
8986, SELECTED DOCUMENTS No. 12B (1979) [hereinafter cited as SALT
11], contains provisions designed to prohibit specific military uses of transnational spatial areas. Article IX(l) provides in part:
Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy:
(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement
on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile
launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the
ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland
waters, or missiles for such launchers;
(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or
any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles;
Id. at 38. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State at the time SALT HI was negoti.
ated, indicated that Article XI(1)(b) was intended, inter alia, to enhance the
obligations of the SACT of 1971. Id. at 39. SALT II has never entered
into force.
9. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701,
T.I.A.S. No. 7337 [hereinafter cited as SACT]. The SACT prohibits emplacement of weapons of mass destruction and facilities designed to store
such weapons anywhere on the ocean floor twelve miles or farther from
the shore-line. Article I(1) details these prohibitions:
The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or
emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil
thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as defined in
article II [i.e., twelve miles], any nuclear weapons or any other
types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures,
launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed
for storing, testing or using such weapons.
See generally Goralczyk, Legal Problemsof the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the
Ocean Floor: Denuclearization,5 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 43 (1972-73); Krieger,
The United Nations Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Aass
Destruction on the Ocean Floor, 3 J. MARITIME L. & CoMM. 107 (1971); Rao,
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty: A Study in the Contemporary Law of the Militay
Uses of the Seas, 4J. MARITIME L. & CoMM. 67 (1972).

10. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
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Moon Treaty.' 2 If either superpower deploys nuclear or
205 [hereinafter cited as OST]. The first paragraph of Article IV of the
OST reads:
State Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.
The provision's purpose is to denuclearize outer space, the moon, and
other celestial bodies. See Dembling & Arons, The Evolution of the Outer
Space Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & CoMM. 419, 432-33 (1967); Vlasic, The Space
Treaty: A PreliminaryEvaluation, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 507, 513-15 (1967); cf.
Stein, Legal Restraints in Modern Arms Control Agreements, 66 AM. J. INT'L L
255, 260-64 (1972) (arguing nuclear weapons of mass destruction, but not
anti-satellite measures, proscribed).
The second paragraph of Article IV of the OST contains a "peaceful
purposes" provision similar to that in Articles 88 and 141 of the LOS Convention, see supra note 6. On the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in the
context of the OST, see C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 22-37 (1982); M. LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 10512 (1972); Dore, supra note 6, at 46-57; Finch, Outer Space for "Peaceful Purposes, " 54 A.B.A. J. 365 (1968); Markoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provision in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3, 4 (1976);
Markov, Against the So-Called "Broader" Interpretationof the Term "Peaceul" in
InternationalSpace Law, in PROc. ELEVENTH Cot.oq0UuM L. OtnER SPACE
73, 75 (1968); Meyer, Interpretationof the Term "Peaceful" in the ight of the
Space Treaty, in PROC. ELEVENTH CouLoquiuM L. OUTER SPACE 24 (1968);
Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 8
CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 454, 467-78 (1978).
11. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. The Antarctic Treaty provides for complete demilitarization of the southernmost continent. Article I(1) reads:
Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There
shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature,
such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the
carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any
type of weapons.
Article VI of the Treaty applies the prohibition of Article I to the area
south of 60 degrees South Latitude, but states that nothing in the agreement affects rights under international law regarding the high seas within
that area. See generally Wilson, Antarctica, The Southern Ocean and the Law of
the Sea, 30 JAGJ. 47 (1978); Comment, The PolarRegions and the Lou, of the
Sea, 8 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 204 (1976).
12. Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 64, 34 U.N. GAOR Annex I at 4, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/34/68 (1979) (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
Moon Treaty]. See generally Christol, The Moon Treaty Enters into Force, 79
AM.J. INT'L L. 163 (1985). Article III of the Moon Treaty states:
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other weapons of mass destruction in outer space or on the
ocean floor, whether states targeted by such weapons will be
able to remove those weapons with international legal sanction may become an issue. Similarly, if either superpower
begins to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer
space, the oceans, or Antarctica, targeted states may ask
whether international law authorizes them to take actions to
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or
threat of hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the moon in order to commit any such act or to
engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon,
spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made space objects.
3. States parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons
or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or place or use
such weapons on or in the moon.
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military manoeuvres on the moon shall be forbidden. The use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or
facility necessary for peaceful exploration and use of the moon
shall also not be prohibited.
See generally Wassenbergh, Speculation on the Law Governing Space Resources, 5
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 611, 619-20 (1980); Zedalis, Will Article III of the
Moon Treaty Improve Existing Law?: A Textual Analysis, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 53 (1980). The OST and the Moon Treaty clearly apply to military
uses of outer space.
The Soviet Union has proposed what it terms an "Anti-Satellite
Treaty," containing provisions directed at military uses of outer space. See
C. GRAY,supra note 1, at 115 (Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space). Article 1(1) of this proposed treaty (hereinafter Anti-Satellite Treaty) provides:
States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the
earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of
any existing type or of other types which States Parties may develop in the future.
Article 3 states:
Each State Party undertakes not to destroy, damage, disturb
the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space
objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit
in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty.
For an analysis of these provisions see Strode, Commentary on the Soviet Draft
Space Treaty of 1981, in C. GRAY, supra note 1, at 85.
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stop such activities. As yet, no state has violated the international agreements mentioned. Nevertheless, the issues to
which such violations might give rise deserve careful attention, particularly in light of recent advances in technology,
which make the scenarios sketched above more than merely
fanciful hypotheticals.
At least two types of factual situations would raise questions about the legality of a targeted state's response to violations of international conventions. The first concerns a
targeted state's perception that a violative military use poses
an imminent risk of attack. In such a situation the targeted
state's right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter' 3 would become relevant. Under Article 51,
a targeted state's resort to armed force in self-defense is permissible if the initial violative military use constitutes an at-4
tack which the targeted state is in the midst of absorbing.1
Self-defense might also be permissible if the initial military
use led to the launching of an attack which the targeted state
had not yet absorbed.' 5 But whether a violative military use
which has not yet led to the launching of an attack can in fact
13. Article 51 states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent

right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the

Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter

to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Article 51 is also relevant when a military use does not violate an international agreement because the state engaging in the use has with-

drawn from the relevant arms control agreement. Article 51 is relc%-ant in
such cases because it covers every case of self-defense.
14. Article 5 I's reference to "if an armed attack occurs" (emphasis added) makes this a rather self-evident proposition. Moreover, to deny a
state the right to defend itself when it is absorbing an attack would make
self-defense a meaningless concept.

15. Justification in those instances in which an attack has been launched

but not yet absorbed may be found in either the notion of anticipatory
self-defense, see infra text accompanying notes 56-139, or the view that an
"armed attack" justifying resort to self-defense has occurred at the mo-

ment launching commences.
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pose an imminent risk to a targeted state's security, and, if it
can, whether such an imminent risk justifies a targeted state's
use of armed force in anticipation of the launching of an attack, prove especially nettlesome questions. The importance
of these questions, brought on by the shift of military power
from men and artillery to jets and rockets, has clearly been
intensified by the prospects of lasers, particle-beam weapons, and other military ordnance capable of performing missions with swiftness approaching the speed of light.
The second type of factual situation in which the lawfulness of efforts by a targeted state to remove deployed weapons or terminate ongoing military activities might come into
question, concerns violative military uses which destabilize
the military equilibrium. A non-exclusive list of such situations would include: cases in which military hardware threatening to the targeted state cannot be removed or military
activities threatening to the targeted state cannot be terminated, because the targeted state lacks the technological sophistication to do so; cases in which military hardware is left
unprotected by the deploying state and therefore subject to
clandestine removal; cases in which threatening military
hardware is considered sufficiently important to the deploying state such that it will resist any removal effort; and
cases in which the deployment of military hardware or the
conduct of military activity necessitates the constant presence of the deploying state's armed forces.
It is of course not always possible to separate these two
types of factual situations from one another. The cases arising in the second of the two broadly defined factual situations may exist in conjunction with a perceived imminent
threat of attack. Nevertheless, when confined to a destabilizing scenario insufficient to pose an imminent threat of attack, the cases in the second category raise several general
concerns: whether international law has established dispute
resolution procedures to deal with arms control violations;
whether the targeted state is obligated to use such procedures before resorting to the unilateral use of responsive
armed force; and, most important, whether the failure of the
deploying state to rectify its violation of international law after dispute resolution has been attempted entitles the
targeted state to undertake its own corrective measures.
This latter concern, which involves the idea of reprisals as
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self-help measures to enforce international law, merits special attention, for "self-help" reprisals may easily be abused;
permitting them also presents the risk that removal or termination efforts will lead to full-scale military conflict.
The legal analysis of both types of broad factual situations must begin with Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter.1 6 This provision prohibits states from threatening
or using "force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." At the outset, it
is important to point out that whether Article 2(4) may be
applied to the factual situations under discussion is subject
to question for two reasons: first, because it is unclear how
literally Article 2(4) should be read; and second, because Artide 2(4) must be read in conjunction with other Charter
provisions. In view of this, several specific issues arise: Is
removal by a targeted state of military objects left unprotected by the deploying state a use of "force" if accomplished without discovery? Does Article 2(4) prohibit the
use of force by the targeted state to remove objects or personnel in a spatial area over which the deploying state has no
claim of control? If the concluding clause of Article 2(4)"or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations"-is the source of such a prohibition, is a
targeted state's contention that its use of force is merely
designed to put an end to another state's violation of an international commitment a legally sufficient justification insofar as such a purpose is consistent with the Charter?
Part II of this Article examines these questions and argues that, with the possible exception of clandestine removal, a targeted state's efforts to remove illegally deployed
military objects, or terminate illegally undertaken military activities, is prohibited by Article 2(4). Part III then asks
whether Article 51 envisions states exercising the right of
self-defense in anticipation of imminent attack. It is suggested that both law and policy support such a right in the
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 states:
All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
the political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
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contemporary world. Reprisals as a self-help measure are
discussed in Part IV. Although the law appears to disfavor
reprisals, it is suggested that the policy argument against reprisals has yet to be fully and convincingly developed. Part V
explores dispute resolution. Specific consideration is given
to Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter' 7 and the dispute resolution provisions of those international agreements
that would be violated by the military use of a transnational
spatial area. The discussion therein suggests that, except
when a targeted state justifiably invokes anticipatory self-defense, there is an obligation to attempt to end the other
state's violation amicably before resorting to force. Finally,
Part VI focuses on whether the "Star Wars" space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) system and the various anti-submarine warfare (ASW) devices capable of deployment on the
ocean floor, may so jeopardize a targeted state's security as
to justify that state's use of force to effect removal. It is argued that under the questionable concept of reprisal, a Soviet use of force to remove an American space-based BMD
system-though unlikely-would be lawful. Similarly, reprisal might justify the use of force by the United States to remove any future Soviet ASW network deployed on America's
continental shelf. There is, however, some doubt as to
whether a Soviet use of force to remove an American BMD
system or an American use of force to remove a Soviet ASW
network would be justifiable under the considerably more established right of anticipatory self-defense. But during a
time of crisis removal of a Soviet ASW network might approach lawfulness.

II.

ARTICLE

2(4)

AND THE USE OF FORCE

Commentators have expressed three views of the prohibition on the use of force articulated in Article 2(4) of the
Charter. The first view is that the injunctions of Articles
1(1)18 and 2(3) 19 , which relate respectively to the mainte17. Id. ch. VI. Chapter VI (Articles 33 through 38) concerns the
peaceful settlement of disputes.
18. Article 1(1) states:
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
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nance of peace and the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, indicate that the Charter's preeminent concern is
the promotion of international peace.2 0 The prohibition of
Article 2(4) is therefore said to be absolute and complete,
admitting only those exceptions expressly provided elsewhere in the Charter 2 l-and those exceptions are to be read
narrowly.2 2 The second view holds that the Charter is not
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and
in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law,

adjustment or setdement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of peace[.J
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
19. Artide 2(3) states: "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered." Id art. 2, para. 3.
20. See, e.g., D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-55
(1958) (describing peace as the "paramount" purpose).
21. Specific reference is made here to individual or collective self-defense, pursuant to Articles 51 and 52, and United Nations enforcement
action, pursuant to Artides 42 and 94(2).
22. See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 275-79 (1963) (rejecting anticipatory self-defense), 301 (rejecting
right of intervention to protect nationals), 341-42 (rejecting right of intervention for humanitarian purposes in protecting non-nationals); L HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141-44 (2d ed. 1979) (rejecting anticipatory
self-defense except in certain extreme circumstances), 145 (expressing
doubt about the lawfulness of intervention to protect lives and property);
P.JESsup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (3d ed. 1968) (rejecting anticipatory self-defense), 169-70 (rejecting intervention to protect lives or
property); H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 797-98 (1950)
(rejecting anticipatory self-defense); H. KELSEN & R. TUCKER, PRINCIPLEs

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-87 (2d ed. 1966) (rejecting right of intervention
to protect nationals); Kunz, Individualand Collective Self-Defense in Article 51
of the Charterof the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947) (rejecting anticipatory self-defense and intervention to protect nationals);
Schwarzenberger, Report on Some Aspects of the Principleof Sef-Defense in the
Charterof the United Nations and the Topics Covered by the Dubrovnik Resolution,
48 Ir'L LA. 550, 617-18 (1958) (Reply from Dr. D. Ninei) (rejecting
anticipatory self-defense) [hereinafter cited as NinEi]; Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under Present InternationalLaw, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951)
(rejecting anticipatory self-defense). The view reflected by these commentators has been termed "restrictionist" and is said to be shared by most
states. See Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to ProtectHuman Rights: Recent iews from the United Nations, in HuMAm
r1mAN INTERVENTION AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 197, 209-13 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). But see Kelsen, Collective
Security Under InternationalLaw, 1954 INT'L L. STUDIES 162 (U.S. Naval War
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limited to the promotion of international peace, nor most accurately construed when the exceptions to Article 2(4) are
read narrowly. Holders of this view insist that the Article
2(4) prohibition is less encompassing than those subscribing
to the first view would have it.23 According to the third view,
College 1956) (indicating acceptance of right of intervention to protect
nationals).
23. See D. BowErr, supra note 20, at 91-104 (characterizing the use of
force to protect nationals and humanitarian intervention as lawful), 188-89

(anticipatory self-defense as lawful); M.

McDOUGAL

& F.

FELICIANO, LAW

AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 23241 (1961) (anticipatory self-defense lawful); M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CON-

TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

862-70 (supporting the use of force to protect

nationals), 874-79 (1981) (supporting humanitarian intervention to pro-

tect non-nationals); I L.

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

309 (H. Lauter-

pacht 8th ed. 1955) (intervention to protect nationals lawful), 312-13 (humanitarian intervention to protect non-nationals lawful); II L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW

156 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1948) (rejecting notion

of permissibility of anticipatory self-defense); A.
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS

THOMAS

& A.

THOMAS,

1965, at 11-18 (1967) (protection of na-

tionals on basis of self-defense lawful), 19-24 (humanitarian intervention
to protect non-nationals, and protection of nationals on basis of self-defense lawful); Farer, Law and War, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER: VOL. III, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

15, 36-43 (C. Black & R.

Falk eds. 1971) (suggesting anticipatory self-defense unlawful), 54-56
(suggesting intervention to protect nationals or non-nationals supported
on humanitarian grounds); Fawcett, Intervention in International Law: A
Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS 341, 361-67 (anticipatory self-defense lawful), 404-05 (intervention to protect nationals permitted under right of self-defense, but severely restricted); Fitzmaurice, The
General Principlesof InternationalLaw ConsideredFrom the Standpoint of the Rule
of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 171-74 (anticipatory self-defense and
intervention to protect nationals on basis of self-defense lawful), 207 (acknowledging developments in international law of human rights, the first
step in the direction of humanitarian intervention to protect non-nationals); Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131,
133 (1984) (use of force to protect nationals and humanitarian intervention to protect non-nationals lawful) [hereinafter cited as Joyner, Reflections]; Lillich, Forcible Self-Help to ProtectHuman Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv. 325
(1967) (humanitarian intervention to protect non-nationals lawful because
international machinery to protect human rights ineffective); McDougal &
Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of InternationalConcern, 62 AM.J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1968) (supporting humanitarian intervention
to protect non-nationals); McDougal & Reisman, Response, 3 INT'L LAW.
438-45 (1968) (supporting humanitarian intervention to protect non-nationals) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Reisman, Response]; Moore, The
Control of Foreign Intervention in InternalConflict, 9 VA.J. INT'L L. 205, 261-64
(1969) (humanitarian intervention to protect non-nationals lawful);
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Article 2(4) has had little if any effect on pre-Charter customary international law regarding the use of force. This view is
based in large measure on both the literal meaning of the
qualifying language of Article 2(4), which describes when
force is prohibited, and the belief that any other reading
would result in the adoption of legal principles unacceptable
24
in practice.
Each of these views focuses on the extent to which the
Charter restricts the use of "force." 25 But exactly how the
Moore, Grenadaand the InternationalDouble Standard, 78 AM.J. INT'L L 145,
153-54 (1984) (protection of nationals lawful); Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaguez, 85 YALE LJ. 774, 800 (1976) (intervention to protect
nationals lawful); Reisman, HumanitarianIntervention to Protect the lbos, in
HumANrrIARiAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177-78 (R.

Lillich ed. 1973) (supporting humanitarian intervention to protect nonnationals); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
InternationalLaw, 81 RECUEIL DES CouRs 455, 467 (intervention to protect

nationals lawful), 497-98 (anticipatory self-defense lawful); Note, Use of
Forcefor the Protection of Nationals Abroad- The Entebbe Inddent, 9 CASE W.

REs.J. INT'L L. 117, 132 (1977) (protection of nationals and non-nationals
lawful on humanitarian grounds). These commentators may be referred
to as having a "realist-restrictionist" view. Cf. J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 2-3 (1974) ("idealist-restrictionist") [hereinafter cited as J. STONE,
OF LAw]; Note, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Reserve
Mission to Iran and its Legality UnderInternationalLaw, 21 VA. J. INTL L 485,

491 (1981) ("realist").
24. See E. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (1948)
(cannot assume that signatories to Charter intended to restrict right of
retaliation in any way); J. STONE, OF LAW, supra note 23, at 2-10, 19-20
(narrowly interpreting Article 2(4) to permit the use of forceful reprisals);
Farer, supra note 23, at 69-72 (noting that United States and Israel each
have sought to justify use of force in reprisal as legitimate). These commentators share a view that may be termed the "traditionalist" view. Cf. J.
STONE, OF LAW, supra note 23, at 28 ("realist-tradiionalist"). But see J.
STONE, LEGAL CoNTROLs OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 286-87 (1954) (appearing to adopt approach to the Charter which precludes legitimacy of
reprisals). Stone's view on reprisals and the Charter may have changed
between 1954 and 1974. For an indication of his evolving view, see J.
STONE, OF LAW, supra note 23, at 33.
25. On whether Article 2(4) applies to the use of force in transnational
spatial areas, seeJ. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 316 (H. Waldock 6th
ed. 1963) (recognizing self-defense on the high seas and, in doing so, signifying the application of Artide 2(4)); G. GAL, SPACE Lw 130-32 (1969)
(noting that U.N. General Assembly resolutions and Article 3 of the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967 apply international law, including the United Nations Charter, to outer space); M. McDOUGAL, H. LAsswELL & I. VLA.sic,
LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE

437-50 (1963). Compare Meeker, Difensive
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Charter defines that term is unclear. The reference in the
Preamble 26 to "armed" force provides the only clue contained in the Charter itself. Yet "force" may encompass
more than simply "armed" force. 2 7 Nevertheless, the definitional breadth of the term "force" would seem to extend no
further than "coercion," which implies all forms of pressure
resisted by a receiving state as well as pressure not resisted
(either because of an inability to undertake resistance or a
conscious decision to forego resistance). In view of this, it
would appear that in situations where military objects
deployed in violation of international law have been left unprotected by the deploying state, efforts to remove such objects or to render them inoperative would not violate Article
2(4)'s prohibition. That is, by effecting clandestine removal
a targeted state avoids the use of coercion.
The language of Article 2(4), prohibiting the threat or
use of force against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any state," would not be helpful when addressing situations in which a state using transnational spatial
areas (hereinafter using state) is likely, because of the importance of the military deployment or presence of its personnel, to resist the removal of its military hardware or the termination of its threatening activities. This would also be the
case if contrary to what was suggested above, clandestine removal was viewed as involving the use of "force" as that term
is understood in the context of Article 2(4).28
Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515, 523-24 (1963) (collective
nature of the quarantine of Cuba in 1962 did not violate Article 2(4),
therefore recognizing that provision's applicability to the high seas) with
Wright, The Cuban Quarantine,57 AM.J. INT'L L. 546, 556-63 (1963) (quarantine not justified under Articles 2(4) and 51).
26. The Preamble to the U.N. Charter includes the following clause:
"to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods,
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."
27. Compare Zedalis, Some Thoughts on the United Nations Charter and the
Use of Military Force Against Economic Coercion, 17 TULSA L.J. 487, 491-97
(1982) (intense economic coercion violates Article 2(4)) with Joyner, The
TransnationalBoycott as Economic Coercion in InternationalLaw: Policy, Place,
and Practice, 17 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205, 240-42 (1984) (broad interpretation of the term "force" as used in Article 2(4) inconsistent with the
language of Articles 39 and 51).
28. When the targeted state is incapable of clandestine removal or termination, the peaceful settlement mechanisms discussed in Part V, will
prove essential. See infra notes 194-276 and accompanying text.
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The right of a targeted state to employ force in such situations may be seen as affecting the freedom of the decisionmaking of the state whose objects or personnel are attacked,
and, therefore, impairing that state's "political independence." 29 It may be that the using state's burden of demonstrating that "territorial integrity or political independence"
can be violated without an invasion of its geographical limits
can be avoided altogether"0 by relying on the language extending Article 2(4)'s prohibition to cases "...
in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."3 1 The import of this clause is to make the organization's "Purposes" member-state obligations. The ultimate
effect of the clause, it might be argued, is to bring many uses
of force, whether or not violative of territorial integrity or
political independence, within the prohibition of Article
2(4). Reliance on the language of this latter clause, however,
is not without its own problems.
First, does the concluding clause of Article 2(4) leave
untouched uses of force "not inconsistent" with a purpose of
the United Nations, or does it simply attempt to suggestperhaps inartfully-that every use of force is prohibited unless justified under exceptional principles (e.g., self-defense)?
Second, assuming that the clause does not prohibit uses of
force "not inconsistent" with a purpose of the United Nations, does the provision of the Charter which sets forth the
organization's "Purposes" state a purpose with which the
29. On defining "political independence," see I. BROWNLIE, supra note

22, at 265-68; R.

HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

POLIrICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 182-83 (1963);
M. McDOUGAL & F. FELicn O, supra note 23, at 176-78.

THROUGH THE

30. The violative objects or personnel, although physically outside the
deploying state's boundaries, might be assimilated to state territory and
therefore viewed as covered by Article 2(4). If so, the targeted state's attempts to remove or terminate the objects might impair the deploying
state's territorial integrity or political independence. Whether such objects or personnel can be assimilated to deploying state territory, however,
is doubtful. See Brownlie, The Maintenanceof InternationalPeace and Security
in Outer Space, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1964). But see Note, Resort to Force
by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality
under InternationalLaw, 21 VA.J. Ir'L L. 485, 512-13 (1980-81) (rejecting

theory that U.S. embassy is U.S. territory, and therefore denying that embassy rescue may be justified as protection of territorial integrity).
31. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 382; Brownlie, supra note 30, at 8.
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use of force to remove threatening military hardware can be
said to be not inconsistent? Answers to these important
questions dearly affect the extent to which efforts to remove
military hardware or terminate military activities in transnational spatial areas can be viewed as justifiable.
A.

Permissibility of Force Not Inconsistent With a Purpose of the
United Nations
A textual reading of the final clause of Article 2(4)32,

which prohibits force "in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations," suggests that force may
be permissibly used if it is not inconsistent with a purpose of
the United Nations. An examination of the discussions surrounding the adoption of the clause, however, implies the
contrary.33 In this regard, it is noted that when, during the
1945 San Francisco Conference on International Organization, the delegate from Brazil suggested that the clause
might have a qualifying effect on the Article 2(4) prohibition,
the United States' delegate responded, without dissent, that
"the phrase 'or in any other manner' was designed to insure
that there should be no loopholes." 3 4 If, indeed, Article 2(4)
has no loopholes, then any force, even that which is not inconsistent with a purpose of the United Nations, is prohibited. But the words of the United States' delegate may mean
something quite different; specifically, that the Article 2(4)
prohibition contains no loophole regarding the ways and
forms in which prohibited force may manifest itself. In other
words, Article 2(4) prohibits not only armed force used to
imperil a state's territorial integrity or political independence, but also force used "in any other manner" inconsistent with the Organization's purposes.3 5 If this latter read32. See supra note 16.
33. See M. McDOUGAL & F.

FELICIANO, supra note 23, at 178-79.
34. Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334-35 (1945). But cf. II L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, at 154 (stating the provision does not exclude

"the use of force in fulfillment of the obligations to give effect to the Charter").

35. Prior to the observation of the United States' delegate, the Brazilian delegate had also raised a question about including in Article 2(4) a

provision to prohibit "economic" coercion. The delegate from Belgium
suggested that, given the phrase "or in any other manner," the change was
unnecessary. See Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334 (1945). (This
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ing is correct, then the American delegate's statement did
not rule out the use of force when not inconsistent with a
purpose of the United Nations.
The strongest evidence that Article 2(4) was not intended to permit force to be used even when not inconsistent with a purpose of the U.N. grew out of the events surrounding the rejection of a Norwegian submission.3 6 The
Norwegian proposal sought to change Article 2(4), which
was then in the form of an Australian amendment to the
Dumbarton Oaks proposal, the seminal draft of the United
Nations Charter.3 7 The Norwegian submission would have
prohibited "any use of force not approved by the Security
Council." 3 8 Although it was rejected because of the ambiguity of the words "not approved," the Norwegian submission
was later described in a subcommittee report as "clarifying
the Australian amendment." 3 9 Earlier, in the discussion of
possible "loopholes" in Article 2(4), the Norwegian delegate
had remarked that "it should be made very clear in the
[Committee's] Report to the Commission that . . . paragraph 4 did not contemplate any use of force, outside of action by the Organization, going beyond individual or collective self-defense." 40 This clarification was incorporated into
the committee's report to the Commission. The report
noted that "in view of the [rejected] Norwegian amendment,
the unilateral use of force or similar coercive measures is not
authorized or admitted" by Article 2(4).41 The report followed this notation by stating that with the exception of "legitimate self-defense," the "use of force, therefore, remains
42
legitimate only to back up decisions of the organization."
may suggest that the American delegate's focus on the same phrase was
intended to indicate that the Article 2(4) prohibition was against the use of
force manifesting itself in a military manner or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.)

36. Doc. 215, 1/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 564 (1945).
37. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNrrED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DocuMENTs 665-66 (3rd & rev. ed. 1969). citing Proposalsfor the Establishment of a General Intenzational Organization,Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, XI DEP'T ST. BuLL.368 (Oct.7, 1944).

38.
39.
40.
41.

See Doc. 215, I/l/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 564 (1945).
Doc. 739, I/l/A/19(a), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 720 (1945).
Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334-35 (1945).
Doc. 885, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 400 (1945).

42. Id.
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The subsequent report to the Plenary Session of the Conference unanimously adopted this approach without dissent,"' 3
leaving little doubt that Article 2(4) does not contain an exception for force even when such force is "not inconsistent"
with a purpose of the United Nations.
B.

"Purposes" of the United Nations: Is the Use of Force Ever
Not Inconsistent?

If, however, the better view is that the concluding clause
of Article 2(4) does not prohibit the use of force when such
force is "not inconsistent" with a purpose of the United Nations, a further question arises. Specifically, does Article 1 of
the Charter, which sets forth the Organization's "Purposes,"
include a purpose with which the use of force in the context
of removal or termination can be said to be "not inconsistent"? The use of force will always conflict with the mainte4
nance of peace, a primary purpose stated in Article 1(1)."

Thus, to determine whether force used under Article 2(4) to
remove military hardware or terminate military activities in
transnational spatial areas is permissible, one must not only
identify a purpose with which a use of force is not inconsistent, but also reconcile such a use of force with the primary
purpose of maintaining peace stated in Article 1(1).
One way to reconcile such a conflict in purposes is
through a balancing approach, which considers the relative
value, in fact-specific situations, of the "Purposes" in opposition. For example, when a state intervenes in a foreign state
to protect its own nationals and others, Article 1(3)'s call for
respect for human rights may outweigh Article 1(1)'s call for
the maintenance of peace. 4 5 Because the final clause of Arti43. Doc. 1179, 1/9/(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 247 (1945).
44. See supra note 18. Article 1(1) enjoins the United Nations to resolve
international disputes or situations by "peaceful means."
45. Some argue that Article 2(4) does not preclude intervention to protect the "fundamental" human rights of both nationals and non-nationals.
See, e.g., McDougal & Reisman, Response, supra note 23, at 442-44 ("humanitarian intervention" remains valid under the Charter); Reisman, supra
note 23, at 172-78 ("[Humanitarian] intervention ... for parties to the
Charter... is mandatory."). Others believe, however, that unilateral intervention by a state is permitted only to protect its nationals and then
own self-defense. See, e.g., D.
only to the extent of the state's interest in its
BOWETr, supra note 20, at 91-94; A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 23,
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cle 2(4) specifies the plural "Purposes," however, this balancing approach may be incongruous with the intent of the
Charter. The choice of the plural "Purposes" may signify
that apart from those uses of force expressly permitted (e.g.,
self-defense), the only other uses of force left unaffected by
the prohibition of Article 2(4) are those not inconsistent with
any and all of the Organization's several "Purposes. " 4 r A

use of force inconsistent with even one purpose would thus
be prohibited, no matter how many other purposes that use
of force might further.
Certainly, not everyone considers the maintenance of
peace a purpose equal in importance to respect for human
rights. 4 7 Supporters of the fact-specific balancing test, howat 19-24; Fawcett, supra note 23, at 404-05; Schachter, The Right of Slates to
Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1628-33 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Schachter, The Right of States]; Schachter, Self-Help in InternationalLaw:
U.S. Action in the IranianHostage Crisis, 37J. INT'L AiF. 231, 241-45 (1984)

[hereinafter cited as Schachter, Self-Help]. But see infra note 47.
46. The choice of the plural "Purposes" suggests at least two other interpretations: that the Charter allows the use of force if it is not inconsistent with at least one of the Charter's many purposes (i., the use must be
inconsistent with all to be prohibited); or that the Charter allows use of
force if it is not inconsistent with at least one of the Charter's many purposes and, in the specific context, that purpose outweighs the others. This
latter interpretation has already been mentioned, see supra text accompanying note 45, and will be addressed again below.
The former interpretation is difficult to accept. Specifically, if the plural "Purposes" means that Article 2(4) does not prohibit a use of force if
such is not inconsistent with at least one of the Charter's purposes (since it
must be inconsistent with all to be prohibited), then the use of the word
"other" in the final clause of Article 2(4) must indicate that such a use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another
state is prohibited, because it is inconsistent with all of the purposes (i.e.,
not even "not inconsistent" with one). Yet under Article 1, force against
territorial integrity or political independence may not be inconsistent with
all of the Organization's purposes, and in particular those set forth in Articles 1(3) (respect for human rights) and 1(4) (United Nations serves as
center for harmonizing actions of nations in achieving common ends).
Therefore, since the plain terms of Article 2(4) still prohibit a use of force
against territorial integrity or political independence, "Purposes" should
not be read in this manner.
47. Cf I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 268-70 (arguing that the broad
language of Article 2(4) rejects customary law of protecting nationals); L
HENKIN, supra note 22, at 137-38 ("the Charter's prohibition on unilateral
force was to apply [and still applies] universally"); P.JEssuP, supra note 22,
at 169-70 (arguing that Article 2(4) prohibits unilateral, as opposed to col-
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ever, have obviously accepted the view that the term "Purposes" was not meant to prohibit uses of force that promote
one U.N. purpose even though its promotion may be inconsistent with another purpose. Any argument in favor of the

balancing test, then, must start with the proposition that in
specific cases, Article 2(4) may not prohibit the use of force
as long as such use promotes one of the Organization's purposes.
Various arguments may be advanced to support this
proposition. 4 8 Its textual plausibility, however, turns on two
points: first, whether refraining from force in order to promote peace may at times be inconsistent with other "Purposes" that the use of force may well advance; and second,
whether the Charter provides any guidance concerning the
permissibility of the unilateral use of force to promote such
other purposes. If any of the U.N.'s purposes are inconsistent under some circumstances with refraining from the use
of force, then perhaps the conflicting purposes of Article 1
must be balanced. 49 If, however, the balancing test applies
only to acts and not to omissions (such as refraining from the
use of force), then whether the Charter addresses the permissibility of unilateral acts of force promoting purposes of
the Organization becomes decisive.
lective, intervention); cf. also Farer, supra note 24, at 27-36 (analyzing various interpretations of Article 2(4) by other scholars); Fonteyne, supra note
22, at 216-18 (citing arguments made in various U.N. General Assembly
debates about the legality of intervention).
48. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 23, at 168-76 (citing legal and policy
arguments in favor of "humanitarian intervention" based on, for example,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the United Nations Charter Preamble and various Articles).
49. Article 2 appears to be directed at action alone. Its opening sentence ("The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes
stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles")
provides that members shall "act" in accord with several principles, including that of paragraph 4 to refrain from the "threat" or "use" of force.
Nothing is said about the permissibility of a decision not to use force. Further, Article 1 has the same thrust. It characterizes the purposes of the
United Nations in terms suggesting action. The purposes stated in the
opening paragraph are to "take" collective measures to maintain peace; in
the second paragraph, to "take" measures to strengthen peace; in the
third, to "achieve international cooperation" in solving international
problems; and in the fourth, to "be a center" for harmonization.
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The precise terms of Articles 55 and 56 provide some
guidance on this latter point. Article 55 reads:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 56 states: "All Members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55."
While Article 56 authorizes joint as well as separate "action"-"action" is undefined-to achieve the purposes in
Article 55, the action must be "in cooperation with the Organization." Thus, even if "action" includes the use of military force, these sections suggest that such force cannot be
wholly unilateral. 50 Still, this analysis does not answer the
question of whether there are circumstances under which the
failure to act would be inconsistent with a purpose of the
United Nations.
The question of whether Article 1 states a purpose with
which the use of force to remove military hardware or to terminate military operations in transnational space can be said
to be not inconsistent is significant. The language of Article
1(1) calls for the resolution of international disputes in conDo the
formity with "justice and international law." 5'
quoted words support a targeted state's use of force to re50. See L. GOODRICH, E. HANMBRO & A. SIMoNs, supra note 37, at 371-82.
But see Reisman, supra note 23, at 175 (states may act "singly. .. in humanitarian intervention").
51. See supra note 18 (for text of Article 1(1)).
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move objects or terminate activities that violate international
law? 52 This argument seems plausible since the force is directed at restoring compliance with those elements ofjustice
and international law reflected in relevant international
agreements. Examined in light of controlling legal principles, however, the argument is unpersuasive.
Article 1(1)'s reference to "justice and international
law" merely points out the requisite character of the terms of
a peaceful resolution to an international dispute. Apparently, the language was not intended to suggest that securing
"justice and international law" is, like the promotion of
human rights under Article 1(3), one of the United Nations'
many "Purposes." The location in the text of the phrase
"justice and international law" makes this clear. 53 Yet even
if "justice and international law" is read as a purpose of the
United Nations, it is difficult to argue that this purpose may
be balanced against the maintenance of peace. Indeed, the
discussions surrounding the adoption of Article 1 (1) indicate
that attempts at the 1945 San Francisco Conference to draft
Article 1(1) so as to permit such a reading failed. 54
52. SeeJ. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 100-01 (1958) (arguing that states may still use force as a means of vindicating rights); J.
STONE, OF LAW, supra note 23, at 2-10 (criticizing the restrictive view of
Article 2(4) that the use of force is prohibited).
53. Article 1 (1) provides that the first purpose of the United Nations is
the maintenance of peace. See supra note 18. That purpose is to be accomplished through (a) collective measures that prevent and remove threats to
the peace or that suppress aggression or other breaches of the peace; and
(b) the adjustment or settlement of international disputes by peaceful
means "in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law."
The phrase "justice and international law" is part and parcel of the Article's reference to the adjustment or settlement of international disputes by
peaceful means. "Justice and international law" are components of the
adjustment or settlement; pursuit of them out of the context of a peaceful
resolution to an international dispute is, therefore, not a purpose of the
United Nations. See also infra text accompanying notes 167-69, which indicates that the phrase "justice and international law" was adopted as part of
a textual arrangement involving the reference to "justice" in Article 2(3)
("All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered."). Apparently, both phrases were intended to safeguard
against the settlement of a dispute by an accommodation, such as the 1938
Munich appeasement, that would result in injury to weak nations.
54. For text of Article 1(1), see supra note 18. Neither the proposal to
insert the word "justice" between the phrases "peace and security" and
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Hence, whether the Charter's reference to "justice and
international law" states a purpose of the United Nations,
and if so, whether that purpose may be balanced against the
maintenance of peace, are questions to which affirmative answers cannot be easily developed. 55 Complications therefore
arise in any attempt to show that the use of force to remove
objects or terminate activities that violate international law is
permissible because it promotes a purpose of the United Nations. Thus, to justify the use of force against a perceived
imminent threat of attack or an action that threatens to create military instability, reference must be had to the doctrines of anticipatory self-defense and self-help reprisal. The
only situation in which it would not be necessary to draw on
these doctrines might involve a nation undertaking the dandestine removal of military objects. In this case, removal
would not involve the use of "force," and therefore would
not fall within the prohibition of Article 2(4).
III. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
Customary international law has long recognized the
right of a state to use military force in anticipation of an
armed attack. In 1841, Secretary of State Daniel Webster
wrote to the British Minister to the United States concerning
The Caroline incident, and stated that the doctrine was applicable whenever the "necessity of self-defense [is] instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation." 5 6 The doctrine was subsequently invoked
"and to that end" (19 for, 12 against), nor the proposal to insert the language "in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law"
at that same location (19 for, 15 against) achieved the two-thirds majority
needed for adoption. See Doc. 944, I/I/34(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 446
(1945); Doc. 926, I/1/36, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 422-23 (1945); Doc. 885, I/
1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 393-95 (1945); Doc. 742, I/1/23, 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 318 (1945). For the same reason, Commission I of the Conference
rejected by a vote of 21 to 21 an Egyptian proposal to insert the language
"in conformity with the principles ofjustice and international law" at that
same location. The Commission then unanimously adopted the language
of Committee I, language that ultimately became Article 1(1). Doc. 1187,
1/13, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 203 (1945); Doc. 1179, 1/9/(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 245-46 (1945).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
56. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, reprinted in 29
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during border skirmishes after World War 157 and again following the Second World War in the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 58 and the Nuremberg Trial of War Criminals. 59
The adoption of Article 5160 of the Charter, however,
raised questions about the continued legality of anticipatory
self-defense. Article 51 recognizes the right to use force in
self-defense, but only "if an armed attack occurs." Some
scholars contend that Article 51 thus eliminates the customary right to use force in anticipation of an armed attack. 61
They find support in both the Charter's general call for
peaceful resolution of international disputes and specific
prohibition of Article 2(4) on the use of force.
Several arguments lend some support to the contention
that the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense lacks continued
legitimacy in the post-Charter world. Each merits attention,
given that a state may well invoke the doctrine if it perceives
that another state's deployment of military objects or conduct of military manuevers in a transnational spatial area is
posing an imminent risk to its national security. 62 Since the
invocation of the doctrine and consequent use of force could
lead to monstrous levels of destruction, it is important to analyze anticipatory self-defense from both a legal and a policy
perspective. After all, of what use is a conclusion that the
law requires a certain kind of behavior if actual conduct is
likely to be inconsistent with the law?
BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129, 1138 (London 1857). See generallyJennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
57. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 257.
58. Judgment of the International Military Tribunalfor the Far East 994
(1948), cited in M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 23, at 231-32
(upholding anticipatory self-defense by the Netherlands against Japan).
59. OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION: OPINION AND JUDGMENT 36-

38 (1947), discussed in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 918 (3d ed. 1971) (rejecting Germany's reliance on anticipatory selfdefense as justification for attacking Norway not on the basis of any objection to the notion ofjustification but on the facts).
60. For the text of Article 51, see supra note 13.
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
62. Whether such objects or activities in fact pose imminent risks will
be explored infra text accompanying notes 277-376.
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A. Article 51 and Anticipatory Self-Defense: An Assessment
of the Law
1. The Text of Artice 5163
Article 51 begins: "[n]othing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs." Some scholars therefore
argue that Article 51 limits the use of self-defense to situations in which an actual armed attack is in progress.' A
thorough reading of Article 51 does not support this conclusion.6 5 Article 5 I's provision for the right of self-defense in
response to an armed attack does not in and of itself mean
that no similar right exists in response to something short of
an actual attack. Such a limitation can be determined only by
reference to other Charter provisions. 66 Furthermore, other
official language texts of Article 51 support a broader reading.6 7 For example, the French text states: "dans un cas ofi
un Membre des Nations Unies est 1'objet d'une agression
arm6e," ("in a case where a United Nations Member is the
object of an armed aggression"); the Spanish text, "en caso
de ataque armado" ("in a case of armed attack"). While
both encompass responses to actual armed attacks, neither is
68
limited thereto.
2.

The Travaux Pr6paratoires, NegotiatingBackground, and
Relation to Article 2(4)

The travaux prparatoiresof Article 51 provide additional
reason for concern regarding the continued validity of antici63. See supra note 13.

64. L. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 141 ("The fair reading of Article 51
permits unilateral use of force only in a very narrow and clear circumstance. .. "); see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 275-76; NintiE, supra
note 22, at 69 (relying on the canon

tceptiones
sunt strictissimaeinterpretationes

and arguing that retaliation allowed only when armed attack occurs).
65. See D. Bow='r, supra note 20, at 188-89; McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Ai. J. INT'L L. 597, 599-600 (1963);
Waldock, supra note 23, at 497-98.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 69-90.
67. See Waldock, supra note 23, at 497.
68. On the French text, see Mallison & Mallison, The IsraeliAerial Attack
ofJune 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15
VAND. J. TRANSNA'L L. 417, 420-21 (1982). See also A. Tho'As & A.
THOMAS, NON-IrNTERVETrON

123 (1956).
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patory self-defense. Specifically, the travauxprparatoirescontain little language approving the use of force in response to
the imminent threat of attack.6 9 Had Article 51's reference
to self-defense "if an armed attack occurs" not been intended to eliminate the preexisting right to act in anticipation, some effort to have the travaux capture that fundamental point would have seemed natural. The failure of the
travaux to do so, therefore, is somewhat suggestive.
Although this reasoning is logical, several pieces of information put the absence of such a reference in the travaux
in better perspective. Principally, Article 51's inclusion in
the Charter was to accommodate the system of international
security envisioned by the Charter with that of the interAmerican system of mutual defense, 70 a system based on the
Declaration of Lima (1938),71 the Act of Havana (1940),72
the Act of Chapultepec (1945), 7 3 and the then-anticipated
Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance (1947).74 The
objective was to ensure that regional defense organizations
would be permitted to engage in forceful collective self-defense even where the U.N. Security Council was unable to
authorize such action as a result of the exercise of a permanent Council member's veto power. 7 5 In adopting Article
51, the framers did not intend to create a right of self-de-

69. L. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 141 ("Nothing in the history of [Article
51's] drafting (the travaux proparatoires) suggests that the framers of the
Charter intended something broader than the language implied.").
70. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 342-44;
McDougal, supra note 65, at 599.
71. Declaration of Lima, Dec. 24, 1938, reprinted in 3 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1776-1949, at 534 (Bevans 1968).
72. Act of Havana, July 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 2491, E.A.S. No. 199.
73. Act of Chapultepec, Mar. 8, 1945, 60 Stat. 1831, T.I.A.S. No. 1543.
74. Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62
Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77.
75. The veto of any permanent Security Council member prevents that
body from acting. See D. BOWETr, supra note 20, at 297-99; Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Defense
Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335, 362
(1962). A veto would have effectively prevented any forceful acts of selfdefense, since under Chapter VIII(C)(2) of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal
forceful measures (even in self-defense) could not have been taken "without the authorization of the Security Council." See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 669, 672, citing Proposalsfor the Establish-
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fense which would not otherwise have existed.7 6 They
merely intended to assure that the right could be exercised
by regional defense organizations without the prior approval
of the Security Council.
Having established that the absence of a reference to anticipatory self-defense in the travaux of Artide 51 should not
be seen as evidence of the elimination of that customary
right, Article 2(4)'s effect on the right remains to be examined. Article 2(4) is relevant here as a result of the opening language of Article 51. That language--"[n]othing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs"does not deal with self-defense in response to something
short of an actual armed attack. Other Charter provisions,
however, may restrict the use of defensive force. The most
obvious is Article 2(4).77 But there appear to be several reasons why that Article should not be read as affecting the customary right of anticipatory self-defense.
First, the text of Article 2(4) prohibits both the use and
threat of force. As a consequence, to avoid the existence of a
lacuna between prohibited force under Article 2(4) and explicitly permitted self-defense under Article 51, defensive
measures in anticipation of an armed attack should be per78
missible.
Secondly, Article 2(4) provides, in part, that "Members
ment of a General InternationalOrganization, Dumbarton Oaks,
DEP'T ST. BuLL.368 (Oct. 7, 1944).

ashington, XI

76. Article 51 describes this right as "inherent". See L GooDlucH, E.
&A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 344. On the need to state inherent
rights, compare statement by Secretary of State Kellogg to the U.S. Ambassador to France, Mr. Herrick, in connection with the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1928 (Apr. 23, 1928), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, I FoR IcN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 36-37 (1928). On the significance of the
right's inherent nature and anticipatory self-defense, compare A. THoMAs
& A. THOMAS, supra note 68, at 123-24.
77. On whether restrictions in the form of pre-conditions exist, see infra text accompanying notes 196-97, for a discussion of peaceful settleHAMBRO

ment of disputes.

78. For support for the conclusion that such anticipatory self-defense
should be permissible, see D. BowEr, supra note 20, at 191-92. See also
McDougal, supra note 65, at 600 ("a decent respect for balance and effectiveness would suggest that a conception of impermissible coercion, which

includes threats of force, should be countered with an equally comprehensive and adequate conception of permissible or defensive coercion").
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shall refrain
from the threat of use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state
.... "79 As a result, to the extent that the use of anticipatory force is in fact defensive, such force is not used
"against" the other state's territorial integrity or political independence and is thus not contrary to the letter of Article
2(4).8 ° What cannot be ignored, however, is that such force
is inconsistent with the Charter's purpose of maintaining
peace and, thus, prohibited by Article 2(4)'s concluding
clause ("in any other manner inconsistent . . ."). But as
noted earlier, Article 2(4) was not intended to jeopardize legitimate self-defense. 8 1 Indeed, the Report of Rapporteur of
Committee 1 to Commission I states that under Article 2(4),
"self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired."'8 2 This language, unanimously adopted in the subsequent report to the
Plenary Session,8 3 suggests that the drafters of Article 2(4)
intended to preserve the customary right of self-defense, not

restrict

it.84

How else could self-defense "remain" and be

left "unimpaired"?
The final reason for not reading Article 2(4) as impairing the customary right of anticipatory self-defense is that
departures from or alterations in customary international law
are not lightly to be presumed.8 5 This is particularly wise
when the failure of the Charter and accompanying negotiating documents to indicate unequivocally the rejection of the
customary right is conjoined with the kind of currently existing political stalemate between East and West.8 6
79. For complete text of Article 2(4), see supra note 16.
80. See D. BowErr, supra note 20, at 152;J. STONE, OF LAW, supra note
23, at 24-26.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
82. Doc. 885, I/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 400 (1945) (emphasis added).
83. Doc. 1179, 1/9(l), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 247 (1945).
84. D. BowErr, supra note 20, at 188.
85. Id.
86. The East-West stalemate has rendered the United Nations virtually
incapable of taking the kind of collective measures required to prevent or
remove threats to international peace. To permit casually the elimination
of the customary right of anticipatory self-defense under such circumstances would risk unnecessary violence. Some have argued that if it is
assumed that Articles 2(4) and 51 eliminate anticipatory self-defense, the
United Nations' inability to take effective collective measures means that
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Relation to Article 2(3)87

The relationship among the various Articles of the Charter provides further evidence supporting concern about the
continued legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense. When Articles 2(4) and 51 are read in conjunction with Article 2(3),
Article 2(3)'s requirement that "[a]ll members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means" suggests that
forceful measures of dispute resolution are always prohibited, unless in response to actual armed attack.88 The absence of a rejection of the customary right of anticipatory
self-defense in either the text or the travaux priparatoiresof
Article 51 is less persuasive support for the continued validity of anticipatory self-defense in light of Article 2(3)'s express requirement. Indeed, Article 2(3) may be read to contradict any evidence supporting anticipatory self-defense and
to enunciate the Charter's principal limitation on the use of
force (with Article 51 providing the only exception thereto).
Nevertheless, it is one thing to argue that Article 2(3)
dictates peaceful dispute resolution, but quite another to
conclude that all uses of force, except those in response to
actual armed attack, are prohibited. Article 2(3) is undoubtedly a logical corollary of Article 2(4),89 but Article 2(3) focuses on how "disputes" are to be resolved, while Article
2(4) focuses on which uses or threats of "force" are prohibited. The placement of the language of Article 2(4) after Article 2(3) is probative in this regard. Yet, if Article 2(3)'s directive means that all uses of force not expressly permitted
by Article 51 are prohibited, it would be difficult to explain
why Article 2(4) follows with an arguably less inclusive prohibition specifically relating to "force." 90 The rational explanation seems to be that Article 2(4) follows Article 2(3) because Article 2(4) alone determines the parameters of permissible "force."
the power to use anticipatory self-defense merely reverts to the memberstates. See, e.g., W.
TIONAL

FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNA-

LAW 259-60 (1964).

87. For text of Article 2(3), see supra note 19.
88. J. STONE, OF LAwv, supra note 23, at 2 (noting that others have de-

veloped this argument).
89. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 4 1.
90. J. STONE, OF LAW, supra note 23, at 5.
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Evidence Outside the Charter

In addition to indications in the Charter suggesting that
doubts about the continued viability of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense are unpersuasive, several non-Charter
sources also provide evidence, though substantially more
equivocal, that tends toward the same conclusion. In the
Corfu Channel Case,9 ' the International Court ofJustice (hereinafter I.C.J.) rejected the argument that four British warships had violated Albania's sovereignty by moving through
Albanian waters with their guns at action station. The I.C.J.
explained that British warships lawfully sailing in the same
area had earlier been attacked by Albania. 9 2 Although the
opinion can be read as raising the possibility that the use of
force in anticipation of an imminent attack might be permissible,93 the failure of the Court to discuss the matter in the
context of Articles 2(4) and 51 suggests that such a reading
goes too far. The failure of the British to plead self-defense, 94 and the fact that the British never actually took preventive action against Albanian shore batteries bolsters thus
conclusion.9 5
Similarly, the 1946 report of the United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission is also ambiguous on the issue of anticipatory self-defense. That report states that, because of the
destructive force of nuclear weapons, "grave" violations of
arms control agreements might "give rise to the inherent
91. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alib.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9,
1949).
92. Id at 31.
93. Waldock, supra note 23, at 500-01. The Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3,
43 (Judgment of May 24, 1980), is more helpful on the legality of intervention to rescue nationals and, perhaps, reprisals to remedy violations of
international law. Judge Morozov, dissenting in U.S. v. Iran, 1980 I.CJ. at
56-57, expresses his view on self-defense when he notes that the U.S. rescue mission was an "invasion," legally justifiable only on the basis of "an
armed attack" of which "there is no evidence that any... had occurred
against the United States."
94. Reply of the United Kingdom (U.K. v. Alb.), 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings
(2 Corfu Channel) 241, 293 (Reply dated Mar. 26, 1948). The plea of the
British agent, Sir Eric Beckett, was that the passage of the four warships on
Oct. 22, 1946, was fully within the right of innocent passage. Id. at 301-02.
95. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 277.
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right of self-defense recognized in Article 51."96 Although
the report suggests a possible right of anticipatory self-defense,9 7 it does not clearly state that "grave" violations include actions preliminary to the actual movement of weapons toward a targeted state.9 8 The report's approval of anticipatory self-defense, therefore, is not necessarily incontrovertible.
These ambiguities notwithstanding, state practice since
the adoption of the Charter has been consistent with the
continued validity of anticipatory self-defense. 9 9 Similarly,
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314, which
contains the Consensus Definition of Aggression,' 0 0 leaves
open the possibility of the right's existence.' 0 ' Article 6 of
the Resolution provides that "[n]othing in the Definition
shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the
scope of the Charter, including provisions concerning cases in
which the use of force is lawful. 10 2 But the inferential signifi96. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2737, FIRST REPORT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL 22

(1946), cited in 5 M. WHrrEMAN, DiGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAWv 980 (1965).
97. See Waldock, supra note 23, at 498.

98. Nor is this point made any more dearly in U.S. DEPT OF STATE,
PUB. No. 2702, UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM No. 3, DEALING WrI1 TIE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTmoRIY AND TIIE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SUBMIrTED TO SUB-COMMrrTEE No. I OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY, App. No. 16, 160, 164 (1946). died

in 5 M. WHITEMAN,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 980 (1965). That document states that under modem conditions an "armed attack" is "something entirely different from what it was prior to the discovery of atomic
weapons." Id. As a result, "attack" should indude "not simply the actual
dropping of an atomic bomb, but also certain steps in themselves prelininary to such action." (Emphasis added.) Id Steps "preliminary" to the
dropping could mean starting the weapons in the direction of the targeted
state. It does not necessarily mean earlier steps. For additional criticism
of using the Atomic Energy Commission report to support anticipatory
self-defense, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 276-77.
99. See D. BowErr, supra note 20, at 188-89; see also Fonteyne, supra
note 22, at 212-13 (arguing that Western states have continued to assert
the right in United Nations organs).

100. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
101. See Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71
AM.J. INT'L L. 224, 243-46 (1977) ("little or no interest" in dealing with
the lawfulness of anticipatory self-defense).

102. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 100, art. VI, at 142 (emphasis added).
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cance of both state practice and the Resolution is questionable because the United Nations has never explicitly approved
the right of anticipatory self-defense in any of its delibera10 3
tions.
In sum, then, the clearest legal evidence supporting the
right of anticipatory self-defense is found in the Charter itself. Evidence outside the Charter, although instructive, is
inconclusive.
B. Anticipatory Self-Defense: A Policy Assessment
There is no doubt that inherent in the recognition of a
right of anticipatory self-defense lies the possibility of nuclear annihilation precipitated by a mistaken assessment of
the imminence of an attack. 104 On the other hand, it is logical to suppose that if the right is not recognized, innocent
and law-abiding nations might become "sitting ducks," entitled to respond only after the time for effective action has
passed.1 0 5 True, deterrence based on second-strike retaliatory capability militates against this latter possibility. 0 6 If a
nation can absorb a nuclear strike and emerge with sufficient
second-strike capability to devastate its opponent's urban
and industrial centers, nuclear war will be deterred without
need for a right to preempt an imminent attack.' 0 7 Current
103. R. HIGGINS, supra note 29, at 200-04 (covering 1945-1961);
Fonteyne, supra note 22, at 211-12 (covering 1961-1971). For commentary on two relatively recent episodes in which the United Nations refused
to approve claims to anticipatory self-defense, see S. MALLISON & W. MALLISON, ARMED CONFLICT IN LEBANON, 1982: HUMANITARIAN LAW IN A REAL
WORLD SETTING 19-34 (1983) (June 1982 Israeli mission into Lebanon);
Mallison & Mallison, supra note 68, at 434-41 (Israeli attack on nuclear
reactor in Baghdad, Iraq). It is not clear, however, whether the United
Nations did not approve the claims because it objected to the notion of
anticipatory self-defense, or because the claims failed to meet the customary international law requisites for anticipatory self-defense.
104. See L. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 142 ("Surely today's weapons
render it even more important that nations should not be allowed to cry
'vital interests' or 'anticipatory self-defense' and unleash the fury.")
105. See McDougal, supra note 65, at 601; Schwebel, Aggression, Intervenlion and Self-Defense in Modern International Law, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS
411, 481; Waldock, supra note 23, at 498.
106. R. ALDRIDGE, THE COUNTERFORCE SYNDROME: A GUIDE TO U.S.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 1-2 (1979) (second-strike capability deters occurrence of first-strike).
107. L. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 142.

Henkin characterizes United
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thought on nuclear strategy, however, suggests that this approach could be fatally flawed. The following subsections on
current nuclear strategy explore this possible flaw.
1. Second-Strike Capability: Where Do We Stand?
In the years of increasing East-West tensions immediately following the Second World War, deterrence was based
on the theory of "balanced collective forces."' 0 8 According
to this theory, the likelihood of conflict diminishes in direct
relation to both the size of the standing armies of the Soviet
and the willingness of those
Union and the United States,
09
nations to use armed force.'
In the 1950s, the United States achieved nuclear superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union through the production of
thermonuclear weapons and accompanying long-range delivery systems, primarily in the form of B-47 and B-36 strategic
bombers."10 This led to a new theory of deterrence, one
based on "massive retaliation," which called for unrestrained
nuclear response to threatening Soviet military activity."I
The impact of the United States' position of nuclear superiority became evident to the Soviets during the Cuban
missile crisis in the fall of 1962.112 The Soviets reacted by
embarking on an ambitious strategic build-up to increase the
number, accuracy, and destructive capability of their own
land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force.'" 3
By the latter half of the 1960s, the United States was beginning to perceive the effects of this Soviet effort. Realizing
that soon it would no longer enjoy strategic nuclear superiority, the United States abandoned the doctrine of massive
States strategic policy: "The argument that 'anticipatory self-defense' is
essential to United States defense is fallacious. The United States relies
for its security on its retaliatory power, and primarily on its second strike
capability." Id.
108. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons andthe Atlantic
Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 753, 754 (1982) (arguing no "first use").
109. The "Balance of Power" theory is synonymous and is similarly defined. SeeJ. SPANIER, GAMES NATIONS PlAY 124-25 (1972).
110. N. POLMAR, STRATEGIC WEAPONS: AN INTRODUCTION 27-28 (1975).
111. See S. HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE: STRATEGIC PROGRAMS
IN NATIONAL PoLrTIcs 74-85 (1961).
112. Nitze, Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Ditente, 54 FOREIGN AFF.
207, 214-16 (1976).
113. 1979 ACIS,supra note 4, at 51.
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retaliation in favor of that of "mutual assured destruction"

(MAD)." 4 MAD relied on both the United States and the
Soviet Union possessing sufficient nuclear firepower to
threaten large-scale elimination of cities and industrial centers even after sustaining a first strike. With neither side capable of initiating a nuclear attack without sustaining unacceptable losses, the balance of terror resulted in deterrence.
During the first half of the 1970s, a large number of
ICBMs in both the United States and the Soviet Union were
scheduled to be fitted with multiple independently targeted
reentry vehicles (MIRVs), a move which would increase the
number of warheads that could be delivered by each
ICBM. 1 1 5 Technological advances in ICBM navigation systems suggested that over roughly the same time period there
would be dramatic improvements in the accuracy of the warheads. 1 6 The increasing number of accurate MIRVed warheads coming on line in the Soviet Union during the 1970s
and 1980s caused concern in the United States about
whether MAD could continue to provide a basis for deterrence. It was thought possible that if at some point during
the 1980s, the Soviet Union were to launch a first-strike
against only the United States' land-based ICBMs, the Soviet
Union would be capable of destroying a substantial number
of the U.S. missile force, while using considerably less than
all of its own strategic forces. 1 7 If that first-strike were suc114. See R. ALDRIDGE, supra note 106, at 2.
115. See 1979 ACIS, supra note 4, at 55.
116. Id. at 58-60.
117. See R. ALDRIDGE, supra note 106, at 3 (noting that some strategists
have theorized that the Russians might "launch an attack on U.S. missile
silos but hold back a sizeable portion of their silo-based missile force to
deter the United States from retaliating against Soviet cities"); Lehman &
Hughes, "Equivalence" and SALT II, 20 ORBIS: J. WORLD AFF. 1045, 1048
(1977) (commenting on the SALT II accord, the authors hypothesize that
if Soviet missile throw-weight is coupled with MIRV technology, the Soviets "could destroy a major portion of our land-based ICBMs in a surprise
first-strike and still retain substantial missile forces for post-attack deterrence"); see also Reflections on the Quarter: Judging SALT II, 23 ORBIS: J.
WORLD AFF. 251, 253 (1979) (during 1982-1985, the Soviets could destroy
90 percent of U.S. ICBMs, the most important component of the U.S. strategic triad, by firing only one-third of its large and increasingly accurate
MIRVed ICBMs). On comparable Soviet vulnerability to U.S. attack, see
Lehman & Hughes, supra, at 1048 ("because of the inferior throw-weight
of the U.S. land-based ICBM force, and because much of the U.S. MIRV
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cessful enough to deprive the United States of a sufficient
number of ICBMs to threaten those land-based missiles held
in reserve by the Soviets, the United States would be forced
to choose between capitulation and using its much less accurate submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to launch
a second-strike against Soviet urban and industrial centers. I Is
The mid-1970s was a period of much debate about the
consequences and acceptability of this choice. MAD supporters suggested that the threat of a second-strike against
Soviet urban and industrial centers was sufficient to deter a
Soviet first-strike against U.S. strategic systems.1 1 9 Opponents countered that the second-strike would provide "minimum deterrence" at best.' 20 Other critics noted that U.S.
"self-deterrence" would give the Soviets a theoretical warwinning capability,' 2 1 because a second-strike would assure
capability is currently in the less accurate SLBM force, the United States

would not have a similar [silo-killing] capability vis-a-vis Soviet land-based
missiles."). Regarding when such a U.S. capability might exist, compare
Lodal, Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative I'iew, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 462,
465 (1976) ("the technology is clearly in hand to permit both sides to obtain [silo-killing] accuracies better than 0.1 nautical miles in the late
1980's. . .") with Lodal, SALT II and American Security, 57 FOREIGN AFF.
245, 257 (1978-1979) ("By [the mid-1980s,] the U.S. land-based missile
force will be able to destroy 80 to 90 percent of the Soviet land-based
MIRVed missile force in a preemptive strike. .. ") [hereinafter cited as
Lodal, SALT I1]. Some experts dispute whether the U.S. MX (or "Missile
Experimental") will have a silo-killing capability. SeeJanesSays MX Missiles
May Lack Power to Destroy Soviet Silos, Tulsa World, Dec. 20, 1984, at B2. col.
1.
118. Reflections on the Quarter,supra note 117, at 253-54. See infra notes
334-35 (while cruise missiles can destroy Soviet ICBM silos and, therefore,
might permit the United States to avoid the choice between capitulation

and counter-city strikes, significant problems exist in actually delivering
the cruise missiles to targets in the Soviet Union).
119. Lehman & Hughes, supra note 117, at 1047 (noting that this is the
assessment of what constitutes "strategic [or essential] equivalence" under
MAD).
120. Nitze, supra note 112, at 227 ("the United States is moving toward a
posture of minimum deterrence").
121. See Nitze, supra note 112, at 227. According to some, however, any
victory flowing from such a Soviet capability would be purely theoretical.
Sagan, in Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe" Some Polity Implicaions, 62
FOREIGN AFF. 257, 292 (1983-1984), observes that the climatic changes
produced from a first-strike, such as that mentioned by Nitze, may cxterminate all life as we know it. See also Comment and Correspondence, 62 FoR-
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retaliatory destruction by the Soviets of U.S. urban and industrial centers.1 22 To restore security, it was argued that
deterrence should be founded on "flexible" or "limited" response, rather than second-strike capability. The "flexible"
response theory meant improving the ability of U.S. strategic

systems to survive a Soviet first-strike,1 23 and enhancing

those systems so that U.S. ICBMs that survived such a first-

strike would be capable of destroying the land-based missiles
held in reserve by the Soviet Union. 12 4 With such systems in
place, "self-deterrence" would not pose a problem, because
the United States would have an option other than one call-

125
ing for the destruction of Soviet cities.
In the final years of the Carter Administration, controversy swirled around the various weapons programs

EIGN AFF. 995-1002 (1984) (reflecting on Sagan's theory). For an assessment of Sagan's conclusions, see Theory About "Nuclear Winter" Revised,
Tulsa World, Jan. 9, 1985, at A15, col. 2.
122. Lehman & Hughes, supra note 117, at 1049; Lodal, SALT 1, supra
note 117, at 255-56.
123. See Gray, The Strategic Force Triad: End of the Road?, 56 FOREIGN AFI:.
771, 785-89 (1978) (listing alternative mobile basing modes for MX);
Lodal, Assuring Strategic Stability, supra note 117, at 474 (agreeing with idea
of mobile ICBMs); Nitze, supra note 112, at 228-30 (suggesting emphasis
on Trident submarines, B-1 bombers, air defense capabilities, and mobile
ICBMs). Apart from these substantive improvements, some have advocated that the U.S. adopt some form of a "launch-on-warning" doctrine.
See Reed, USAF in the Forefront of the C3 Revolution, 59 A.F. MAo. 62, 65 (July
1976); Widder, Launch-on-Warning: A Counter to the Arms Race, A.F.U. REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 95. For a critique of launch-on-warning, see Gray, supra,
780-81.
124. See Nitze, supra note 112, at 227-28; see also Aldridge, MaRVs in
Sheep's Clothing, NATION, Aug. 17, 1974, at 102-03 (discussing terminal guidance warning navigation system); Downey, How to Avoid Monad-And Disaster, 24 FOREIGN POL'Y 172 (1976) (discussing terminal guidance warhead
navigation systems).
125. See Schlesinger, Flexible Strategic Options and Deterrence, 16 SURVIVAL
86, 89-90 (1974). Many have questioned the feasibility of limited nuclear
conflict. See Harold Brown, 1979 DEF. DEP'T ANN. REP. 53 (dated Feb. 2,
1978) (limited strategic nuclear conflict); Bundy, Kennan, McNamara &
Smith, supra note 108, at 757 (limited tactical nuclear conflict); McNamara,
The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions, 62 FoREIGN AFF. 59, 72 (1983) (limited tactical nuclear conflict); see also Sakharov,
The Danger of Thermonuclear War, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 1001, 1006 (1983). Assuming these questions about limited nuclear conflict are warranted, possessing a flexible response capability is arguably meaningless, since a firststrike will rapidly escalate to full-scale nuclear war.
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designed to provide the United States with the "flexible response" capability necessary to reduce the threat U.S. landbased ICBMs were projected to face during the 1980s. 126 In
the midst of this controversy, the Administration adopted
Presidential Directive 59,127 which, as described by former
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, advocated a "countervailing" or war-fighting capability to frustrate Soviet military
ambitions at all levels of engagement. This new strategy entailed a shift from deterrence based on assured retaliatory
destruction of Soviet urban and industrial centers, to deterrence based on the ability to match Soviet weapons escala1 28
tion at every turn.

Both "flexible response" and "countervailing" capability have a counter-silo or counterforce component. Thus,
the latter strategic theory is a logical and natural outgrowth
of the former.' 29 Full implementation of either doctrine
might well improve the security of the United States while at
the same time jeopardize that of the Soviet Union, since the
weapons able to provide counterforce effect are the same
weapons the United States could use to launch a disarming
first-strike against the Soviet Union. 3 0
126. See Garwin, The Right 'Basket'forOur MX 'Eggs', Wash. Post,June 17,
1980, at A17, col. 1; Woolsey, Getting the MX Moving, Wash. Post, May 22,
1980, at A17, col. 2; House Rejects Move to Delay Development of MX Missile,
Wash. Post, May 16, 1980, at A8, col. 1; Wilson, Hatfield J1ants Missiles
Based at Sea, Not on Land, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1980, at A9, col. 4; Greenberg, Missiles at Sea, Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1979, at A19, col. 2; Pincus, Pentagon Proposes New Mobile Basing System for MX Missiles, Wash. Post, July 18,
1979, at A12, col. 1.
127. See Pines, Rethinking the Unthinkable, TblE, Aug. 25, 1980, at 30.
128. Tucker, The Nuclear Debate, 63 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 10 (1984) (quoting
Harold Brown).
129. The "Counterforce" capability developed from the thinking of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. See Commencement Address by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at Ann Arbor, Michigan
(June 16, 1962), reprinted in 47 DEP'T ST. Buu.. 64-69 (July 9, 1962). It
languished in the late 1960s, see Sloss, The Strategists Perspective, in BALtISnc MissiuL DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 24, 41-42, but began to reappear in

the mid-1970s in the form of a "flexible response" targeting option. See
Schlesinger, supra note 125, at 136. On Soviet "counterforce" capability,
see Payne & Gray, supra note 1, at 839 ("it is clear that one reason for the
Soviet commitment to large numbers of strategic weapons is to achieve a
damage limiting effect through offensive 'counterforce' capabilities").
130. This point was made by the Congressional Budget Office as early as
1978. It stated:
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What does the historical development of U.S. strategic
deterrence theories tell us about the need for a legal concept
permitting anticipatory self-defense? From the late 1960s
through the 1970s, when deterrence was based on assured
second-strike retaliatory capability, anticipatory self-defense
was not an essential right. The superpower nations' awareness that mutual destruction would result if either launched
a nuclear attack was sufficient to prevent them from initiating
an attack. Any right to self-defense in anticipation of such an
attack contributed little, if anything, to security.
Assuming the current vulnerability of United States
ICBMs, however, the policy analysis changes considerably.
Preemptive or anticipatory self-defense may well be a necessary policy choice, however undesirable, as long as the Soviets are able to launch a disarming first-strike against U.S.
land-based missile silos. In extreme cases, preemptive selfdefense might involve action against destabilizing Soviet
ICBMs before they could be used to threaten the legitimate
security interests of the United States. Once the United
States closes the so-called "window of vulnerability," its possession of any disarming first-strike weaponry will undoubtedly raise similar claims in Moscow. Moreover, as the technological arms race accelerates, if either or both sides are
able to destroy the other's retaliatory capability, the need for
decisionmakers to have the option to use military force in
anticipation of an imminent, disarming first-strike will be eviThere may be an inescapable dilemma in the procurement of second-strike counterforce capability; a U.S. arsenal large enough to
attack Soviet ICBMs after having absorbed a Soviet first-strike
would be large enough to threaten the Soviet ICBM force in a
U.S. first strike. Moreover, the Soviet Union, looking at capabilities rather than intentions, might see a U.S. second-strike capability in that light.
CONG. BUDGET OFF., BACKGROUND PAPER 32, COUNTERFORCE ISSUES FOR
THE U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES (1978).
On the destabilizing effect of specific counterforce weapons being developed by the U.S., see 1980 ACIS, supra note 4, at 54-55; 1979 ACIS,
supra note 4, at 64-65 (on new Trident SLBMs); Fiscal Year 1979 Arms Control Impact Statements: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (Joint Comm. Print
1978) (on MX missile); Burrows, supra note 1, at 844 (on President Reagan's "Star Wars" initiative). On the destabilizing effects of space-based
weapons generally, see Andelman, Space Wars, 44 FOREIGN POL'Y 94, 10304 (1981).
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dent. Without this option, the space- and ocean-based weap-

ons systems currently under consideration could prove dangerously disruptive of the military balance.
At this point, one might ask whether the continued recognition of the legality of anticipatory self-defense creates a
problem as serious as the one it is meant to address. More
specifically, does not the preemption of an imminent, disarming first-strike inevitably lead to large-scale destruction
and even nuclear annihilation? Not necessarily. A nation
faced with an imminent attack may, in some cases, successfully thwart that attack with force insufficient to result in the
threatening state's belief that it is justified in further escalation or retaliation. More significantly, if the preemptive attack effectively neutralizes the threatening state's ability to
launch a disarming first-strike, then a certain degree of military equilibrium will be restored. This fact alone makes it
unlikely that the threatening state, against which the preemptive attack is launched, will retaliate. This conclusion
might not obtain, of course, where the state under preemptive attack had adopted a launch-on-warning strategy. But
the risks associated with a launch-on-warning strategy make
it as undesirable an approach for a state under preemptive
attack as it is for a strategically inferior state which might use
launch-on-warning to escape first-strike threats.' 3 1 In both
cases, launch-on-warning may serve to precipitate full-scale
nuclear conflict.
2.

A Flat Prohibitionon Anticipatory Self-Defense: No
Temptation to Use Force

There is a second policy argument against anticipatory
self-defense: a flat prohibition is preferable to a prohibition
which permits exceptions in cases of imminent threat of attack. By providing for no exceptions, this argument asserts,
the flat prohibition reduces the temptation to use force.
Were exceptions permitted, states might be inclined toward
conduct allowed by the exceptions. If Article 51 is interpreted as not authorizing the use of force in anticipation of
an armed attack, states will be less likely to use anticipatory
force. Conversely, if Article 51 is understood to authorize
131. See 1979 ACIS, supra note 4, at 75; see also supra note 123 (adopting
a launch-on-warning policy when in a position of strategic inferiority).
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anticipatory self-defense, states will be less inclined to refrain from using force.
To be sure, an exception to any general rule opens the
possibility for abuse. Nevertheless, the potential for abuse
will be affected by the self-interest of the state invoking anticipatory self-defense. Thus, if state A perceives state B as engaging in provocative military activities, state A's urge to
preempt will be tempered by its awareness that preemption
will require military expenditures and a costly engagement in
human terms. It is these factors, rather than perceptions
about existing legal standards, which will likely determine
whether preemption will occur.
3.

A Flat Prohibitionon Anticipatory Self-Defense: No Possibility
of Mistake

A flat prohibition might also be argued to be an attractive policy for a related reason. That reason concerns the
role law should play in situations of genuine threats to the
survival of humankind. When nuclear weapons are aimed at
a nation, that nation's leaders will have their perceptions of
the imminence of an attack affected and, as a result, may be
inclined to act even though no real threat exists. A flat prohibition, therefore, would be desirable to offset the possible
effects of such misperceptions. 1 32 Unambiguous and absolute, a flat prohibition removes the slightest chance of triggering "the fatal spasm" because of a mistaken assessment of
an opponent's intentions.
While investing international law with the capacity to affect conduct may be well-intentioned, it is important to recognize that decisionmakers sometimes must act in situations
in which national well-being and even national survival may
be at stake.' 3 3 Under these circumstances, the only significant restraint on the use of preemptive force is the possibility
132. Farer, supra note 23, at 39-40.
133. Followers ofJohn Austin dispute the existence of "law" governing
international relations. See Austin, The Province ofJurisprudenceDetermined, in
JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 471, 503
(G. Christie ed. 1973). Those who argue that law governing international
relations exists because self-interest results in adherence to the standards
the "law" purports to establish, acknowledge the strong influence of selfpreservation on the shape of the law. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra
note 5, at 87-88 (on law of the seas); Almond, Law and Armed Conflict. Some
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that it might not succeed. It is unlikely that any legal principle will be adhered to which runs counter to the instinctual

urge to protect through preemption, no matter how the international community views anticipatory force.' 3 4 Some
may deal with the ineluctability of this urge to preempt by
arguing that anticipatory self-defense against an imminent

nuclear attack is beyond the realm of law.13 5 Nevertheless,
given the practice of states of using force to preempt imminent threats of conventional attack,' 3 6 any such line-drawing
may be illusory.
Another equally important reason to reject a flat prohibition on anticipatory self-defense concerns the potential impact of such a prohibition on world stability. It could be argued that by itself a flat prohibition may not affect international stability. Nations which might otherwise need to
resort to anticipatory self-defense could simply improve
their military position, thereby guaranteeing the ability to
deliver the kind of devastating second-strike that would de37
ter a potential aggressor from ever launching a first-strike.'
In democratic societies, however, movements periodically
surface which seek the reduction of military budgets or extrication from essential positions of international responsibility. 3 8 Given this phenomenon, the wisdom of a flat prohibiof the Shared Policies, 9 CASE W. REs.J. INTL L. 175 (1977) (on armed con-

flict).

134. See W. FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 260 (statements of President
Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis indicate overwhelming influence
of self-preservation).
135. See L. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 143-44. Henkin advances two reasons: first, realistically, it makes no sense to view law as covering such
instances; second, the Charter, written in a different era, did not contemplate such instances.
136. The most common contemporary instances involve die Middle East
conflict and preemptive strikes against Israeli military posts or targets suspected of terrorism.
137. Clearly this ability to deter would not exist unless one had such a
second-strike capability.
138. See R. FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOrmACY: A HISTORY 470 (1975) (on
Senator Gerald P. Nye's "merchants of death" campaign in the 1930s); H.
MORGENTHAU, PoLmcs AMONG NATIONS 37-38, 196 (5th ed. 1973) (on isolationism in the United States and Great Britain); Ravenal. Consequences of
the End Game in Vietnam, 53 FOREIGN AFF. 651-67 (1975) (on fall-out of

Vietnam experience); Tucker, supra note 128. at 1-32; Yankelovich &
Doble, The Public Mood. Nuclear Weapons and the US.S.R., 63 FOREIGN AFF.
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tion is drawn into question. It is possible that a democratic
nation believing anticipatory self-defense to be unlawful
might find itself forced to choose from among limited policy
options after awakening to find that well-intentioned advocates have set in motion programs increasing its military vul13 9
nerability to totalitarian adversaries.

IV.

REPRISAL AS A SELF-HELP MEASURE TO REMEDY
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

When military use of a transnational spatial area violates
international law but does not pose an imminent threat to a
targeted state, anticipatory self-defense will not justify a use
of force designed to end the violation. In such a situation,
any effort by the threatened state to justify the use of force
must rely on the customary right of reprisal as a self-help
measure.
The customary right of reprisal appears to be of rather
ancient origins.140 It permits the use of military force in certain limited circumstances. Most commentators point to the
Naulilaa Incident Arbitration1 4 ' for the specific parameters governing reprisals. That case involved a dispute over the lawfulness of German military coercion against Portuguese authorities in Angola in 1914. The arbitrators imposed three
conditions on the use of reprisals: 1) the offending state
must have committed an act contrary to international law; 2)
the injured state must make a demand on the offending state
and that demand goes unsatisfied; and 3) the force used in
42
the reprisal must be proportionate to the offending act.'
33-46 (1984) (focusing on current public debate concerning nuclear conflict).
139. Realistically, a state may act before this time. On the need to keep
law and practice in line, see infra text accompanying note 192.
140. Waldock, supra note 23, at 458 (tracing the right of reprisal to the
system of private reprisals which operated during the 14th to 18th centuries).
141. Portuguese-German Arbitral Tribunal, 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409, 2
R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1012 (1928), translatedand discussed in W. BimSop, INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 903-04 (3d ed. 1971). In the

language of the arbitral decision: "Reprisals are an act of self-help. . .on
the part of the injured state, responding after an unsatisfied demand to an act
contrary to international law on the part of the offending state." Id. at 903
(emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 904; see infra note 278.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1985]

VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

117

Reprisals apparently remained lawful under both the
Covenant of the League of Nations 43 and the KelloggBriand Treaty of 1928,144 since neither instrument went further than to forbid resort to "war."' 45 The prohibition in
the United Nations Charter against the threat or use of
"force" signalled an intent to broaden the range of prohibited coercive acts. Thus, when the Charter's prohibition on
"force" is viewed in light of the obligation to resolve disputes peaceftilly, it seems that the continued validity
of the
customary right of reprisal is drawn into question.1 46
A.
1.

Reprisals: An Assessment of the Law

Use of Force to Ensure Respect for InternationalObligations:
First Paragraphof the Preamble

14 7
The first paragraph of the Preamble of the Charter
may provide legal justification for the continuation of the
customary right of reprisal. That paragraph states that the

143. 1 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1 (1931).
144. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 59.
145. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 219-24; M. McDOUGAL & F. FEUctA o,supra note 23, at 138-43; II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, at 151-52,
184-86.
146. This view is accepted by most authorities. See D. BowETr, supra
note 20, at 154-55; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 281,431; M. McDOUGAL
& F. FELICIANO, supra note 23, at 208 n.193 (reprisals against "lesser
wrongs" characterized as illegal); A. THohts & A. THoMAs, supra note 23,
at 13-17; Fitzmaurice, The Foundationsof the Authority of hternationalLaw and
the Problem ofEnforcement, 19 MOD. L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1956); Fitzmaurice, supra
note 23, at 119-20; Waldock, supra note 23, at 493. But see authorities cited
supra note 24. Compare II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, at 151-54 (suggesting reprisals illegal) with 143-44 (suggesting the legality of reprisals is
arguable because no effective centralized peacekeeping body exists).
147. U.N. CHARTER Preamble, para. 1 states:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom...
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peoples represented in the United Nations are determined
respect for the ob"to establish conditions under which.
ligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained."' 48 When a state undertakes
the removal of military objects deployed in, or the termination of military activities conducted in, a transnational spatial
area in violation of international obligations, that state might
attempt to justify its actions as preserving the "establish[ment] of conditions under which. . respect for the obligations"' 49 would be maintained. Thus, such actions might
be defended as lawful and consistent with Charter commitments.
There are several problems with this argument. Most
important, the Preamble's first paragraph indicates a preference for collective rather than individual action to accomplish that paragraph's goal. The "Peoples of The United Nations" have stated their determination to establish conditions which ensure respect for international obligations. The
third paragraph of the Preamble highlights the collective nature of this determination in stating that the peoples "Have
Resolved To Combine [Their] Efforts To Accomplish [That
Aim]". Yet even if individual action to implement the first
paragraph is consistent with the Preamble, no single paragraph ofthe Preamble establishes substantive rights or duties. In the words of the 1945 Report of the Rapporteur of
Committee 1 to Commission I, the Preamble "introduces the
Charter and sets forth the declared common intentions
which brought [the nations] together."' 50 These intentions
are to be distinguished from the Organization's "common
ends," found in the Charter's statement of Purposes, and its
"regulating norms" set forth in the Charter's Chapter on
Principles.' 5 ' The Preamble is an integral part of the Charter, but it does not define the basic responsibilities of mem52
ber states.'
This does not mean that the first paragraph of the Pre-

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id
Id.
Doc. 944, 1/1/34(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 446 (1945).
Id.
L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 20.
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amble is meaningless. Both United Nations practice' 53 and
accepted principles of treaty interpretation'll indicate that
recourse may be had to preambular language when attempting to construe the substantive provisions of a treaty commitment. Also, read in conjunction with the Preamble, Article 14 of the Charter indicates that the U.N. General Assembly is empowered to issue recommendations for the peaceful
adjustment of situations affecting international treaty commitments. Specifically, Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, likely to impair
the general welfare or friendly relations among nations".' 55
In light of the first paragraph of the Preamble, Article 14's
reference to "regardless of origin" indicates that situations
referred to may include those arising from the breach of international treaty commitments. The background of both
Article 14 and paragraph 1 of the Preamble supports this interpretation. Both found their way into the Charter as a
compromise growing out of the American delegate's proposal to include a substantive provision authorizing General
Assembly input on existing international treaty commit-

153. See discussions on the "United Action for Peace" resolution at 5
U.N. GAOR C.1 (362d mtg.), para. 21, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/SR.S62 (1950);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of
the United Nations, Preamble, paras. 2-3, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (Preamble of Charter
referred to in course of fleshing out substantive Charter provisions) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles]; see also Doc. 944, I/1/34(1), 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 447 (1945).
154. See Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the International Labour Organization and International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, 1922 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 2, at
25-27; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM.J. IN'rL L. 875, 885 (1969).
155. U.N. CHARTER art. 14. Article 14 states:
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly
may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the
general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of provisions of the present
Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations.
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ments. 56 Nevertheless, an examination of the language of
Article 14, language which provides substantive content to
that of paragraph 1 of the Preamble, reveals little reason for
doubt that forceful measures of reprisal taken by individual
states to remedy violations of international law are not contemplated.
2.

Use of Force in the Common Interest. Second
Paragraphof the Preamble

The second paragraph of the Preamble declares that
"armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest." 157 Does this paragraph permit forceful reprisals "in the
common interest"? Focusing on the quoted language alone,
it would appear the answer is yes. But again, that answer
would relate only to the collective use of armed force as a
reprisal. Furthermore, this simple affirmative response does
not address the legal status of collective reprisals. As suggested above, the Preamble is merely a declaration of the intentions of the world community in forming a collective and
united body. Articles 39 and 42, which grant the power to
use military force to maintain peace and security, may, however, provide the necessary substantive authorization for the
collective use of armed force in a reprisal.1 5 8
When looking for a similar substantive provision which
156. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO &A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 141-43.
The United States delegate making the proposal was Senator Arthur H.
Vandenberg. Id.

157. U.N.

CHARTER

Preamble, para. 2 states:

[We the peoples of the United Nations determined]... and
for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace
with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength to
maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples...
158. Under Article 39 the Security Council has the authority to make
"recommendations" designed to maintain or restore international peace
and security. It is possible that the Council might, therefore, recommend
that an individual state take forceful reprisals to remedy violations of international law. Reprisals taken on the basis of such a recommendation
would thus have the advance authorization of the collective world community.
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might be construed to govern reprisals by individual states,
one runs up against Article 2(4). The text and negotiating
history of that provision, discussed above, make plain that its
prohibition on the use of force is nearly complete; 59 the
only use of force by an individual state left indisputably untouched by Article
2(4)'s prohibition is the traditional right
60
of self-defense.1
3.

Article 2(3)'s Reference to 'Justice" as an Exception to Article
2(4): The Text and the Travaux Preparatoires

Although the first and second paragraphs of the Preamble appear not to support the continued existence of a right
of reprisal, it may be reasoned that the obligation of Article
2(3)161 to settle disputes so as not to endanger international
peace, security, and justice does support such a right. Article
2(3)'s reference to "justice"'1 2 is distinguishable from the
earlier discussed reference to "justice" in Article 1(1).165 In
the context of Article 1(1), the word "justice" was examined
to determine if it was one of the "Purposes" of the United
Nations, thus enabling it to support the view that force used
to remove military objects or terminate military activities violative of international law is untouched by the basic prohibition of Article 2(4). In the context of Article 2(3) the word
"justice" is examined to determine if what is prohibited by
Article 2(4) is nonetheless permitted as an exception under
Article 2(3). At least one learned scholar has accepted this
approach. In his view, the use of force to accomplish some
just end is permissible; any other reading would make Artide
4
2(3)'s reference to "justice" difficult to explain.16
159. See supra text accompanying notes 18-55.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50 for analysis of suggestion
that intervention to protect nationals and non-nationals is permitted.
161. For the complete text of Article 2(3), see supra note 19.
162.

.

. settle... disputes

such... that international peace

and security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 2. para.
3.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
164. J. STONE, OF LAW, supra note 23, at 5,8. Stone also suggests that

any other approach would make it "impossible to see why [Article 2(3)]
should be followed immediately, in Article 2(4), with a ban stated in apparently more limited fashion." Id at 5. As has already been discussed, see
supra text accompanying notes 18-55, Article 2(4) includes all uses of
force, except those taken in self-defense.
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This argument notwithstanding, the location of the
word 'justice" within Article 2(3) suggests it does not authorize individual states to use force to bring about justice by
compelling the observance of international obligations. Instead, the context within which the word appears indicates
only that whenever an international dispute exists, states
must settle it peacefully, with the aim of the settlement being
to avoid endangering international peace, security, and justice. "Justice" is merely part of the peaceful resolution of
international disputes. Were the call for "justice" meant to
enable states to argue that certain uses of force are permissible,' 6 5 the placement of the word within Article 2(3) would
to settle
have indicated that it qualified the very obligation
1 66
international disputes "by peaceful means."
The travauxpriparatoiresrelating to the adoption of Article 2(3) support the conclusion that Article 2(3) was not
meant to endorse the customary law right of reprisal. Reference to "justice" was included in Article 2(3) in conjunction
with the inclusion of "justice and international law" in Article 1(1).167 Both references were simply intended to ensure
against the possibility of dispute settlements injurious to
weaker states.' 68 Neither reference was meant to create a
loophole that could be used to justify the use of force. 169
Hence, there seems little doubt that the conclusion drawn
from the grammatical structure of Article 2(3) is corroborated by the negotiating history of that provision. Like the
Preamble, Article 2(3) does not appear to support the continued validity of the right of reprisal.

McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 23, at 178 n.140.
166. The drafters had no such intention in mind. See Doc. 885, 1/1/3, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 399 (1945).
167. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 27-28,
41; see also text accompanying notes 53-54.
168. For an example of such a settlement, consider the 1938 Munich
agreement among the British, the Italians, the French, and the ruling Nazi
faction in Germany. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note
37, at 27-28, 41.
169. Some did express concern that the reference might engender ambiguity. See R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 658
(1958).

165. M.
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4. Sources Outside the Charter: U.N. Practice
and I.C.J. Opinions
Considering the demonstrated weakness of each of the
foregoing arguments in favor of the right of reprisal, it
should come as no surprise that arguments supporting the
right's existence in the post-Charter world suffer assault
from at least two other sources. The first is U.N. practice;
the second, opinions of the International Court ofJustice.
United Nations practice, as reflected both in the Organization's responses to conflict situations and in normative
standards embodied in legislative enactments, has characterized reprisals as contrary to the Charter. Resolutions condemning reprisals as inconsistent with Charter obligations
were issued 13 times during the first 25 years of the Organization's existence. Some of the conflict situations which
prompted the resolutions include the 1953 Qbya, 1955
Gaza, and 1956 Lake Tiberias incidents, the June 1967 Six
Day War, the December 1968 Beirut International Airport
raid, the 1964 British attacks against Yemeni forces in Fort
Harib, Yemen, and the 1969 Portuguese attack on
1 70
Zambia.
The Organization's legislative enactments leave no
doubt about the U.N.'s rejection of a right of reprisal. The
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
7
in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations,' '
provides a prime example. The first principle of the Declaration recaptures the essence of Article 2(4) of the Charter. 172
The sixth paragraph of the elaborative statements appended
to the principle notes that "[s]tates have a duty to refrain
from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."1 73
I.G.J. pronouncements also tend to negate the right of
170. See R. HIGGINS, supra note 29, at 217-18; 12 M. WHrrEhAN, DiGEsr
OF INTERNATIoNAL LAW 161-87 (1971); Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse
lo Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 33-36 (1972).
171. See supra note 153.
172. Declaration on Principles, supra note 153, at 121. The first principle provides: "The principle that States shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations." Id.
173. See supra note 153.
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reprisal, although not definitively. In the Corfu Channel
Case,174 the British argued that a minesweeping operation to
clear the waters of mines laid by Albania in contravention of
international law constituted a justifiable intervention in selfhelp to remedy the breach of a general international obligation.1 75 The Court disagreed, finding the minesweeping to
be a violation of Albanian sovereignty, notwithstanding Albania's failure to fulfill its obligation to remove the mines. 1 70
The Court also noted that the action could not be justified as
an effort to collect evidence. Any such effort, the Court explained, could only be regarded as "the manifestation of a
policy of force, such as has in the past given rise to most
serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law." 1 7 7 Although the Court discussed manifestations
of a "policy of force," it made no reference to Charter provisions that affect the use of force. Most likely, the I.C.J. had
self-help as a remedy for violations of international law in
mind, but as with the portions of its opinion dealing with
anticipatory self-defense, no reference was made to Charter
provisions that govern the use of force. Thus, the opinion is
not conclusive as to whether the customary right of reprisal
measure continues to be permissible under the
as a self-help
78
Charter.1
The 1980 I.C.J. opinion in the Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 179 of primary interest on the matter of humanitarian intervention to protect
nationals of the intervening state, offers some additional insight into the permissibility of reprisals under contemporary
international law.' 8 0 In addressing the ill-fated American
174. U.K. v. AIb., 1949 I.C.J. at 4.
175. Statement by Sir Eric Beckett (U.K. v. Alb.), 1950 I.CJ. Pleadings
(3 Corfu Channel I) at 294-96; Reply of the United Kingdom (U.K. v.
Alb.), 1950 I.CJ. Pleadings (2 Corfu Channel) at 282.
176. 1949 I.C.J. (Merits) at 35.
177. Id.
178. Cf. Schachter, The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 Am.J. INT'L
L. 645, 650 (1984) (criticizing U.K.'s defense that force is permissible if
promoting international justice and generally discussing the use of force
against governments unresponsive to popular self-determination). Contra
Waldock, supra note 23, at 502.
179. U.S. v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 3.
180. See generally Schachter, Self-Help, supra note 45, at 245 (indicating, in
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rescue attempt of April 24-25, 1980, the Court indicated that
it was not favorably disposed to the use of force in the relations between nation-states. Noting that it "[could not] fail
to express its concern in regard to the United States incursion," the Court stated it was "bound to observe that [the
incursion], from whatever motive, [was] of a kind calculated to
undermine respect for the judicial process," which had been
initiated on November 29, 1979.181
Backing away from any final legal characterization of the
so-called "incursion," the Court pointed out that the legality
of the rescue attempt was not before it.182 In the estimation
of Judge Morozov, the Court was not compelled to abstain
from expressing its view on that matter.18 3 Judge Morozov's
dissenting opinion, 8 4 as well as Judge Tarazi's, 8 5 characterized the incursion as violative of the Charter because it did
not meet the requirements of Article 51.186 Although the
majority indicated an aversion to the use of force, it is not
clear that it shared the view of Morozov and Tarazi that force
is lawful only when used under the precise circumstances set
forth in Article 51.
B.

Policy Assessment of the Right of Reprisal

The Charter and its negotiating history, current United
Nations practice, and the opinions of the World Court indicate that the right of reprisal is a relic. But is this conclusion
supported by sound policy considerations? As before, the
fact that the matters of concern here involve nation-state security makes this sort of inquiry of the utmost, if not controlling, importance. The ineffectiveness of the United Nations
in maintaining peace, security, and respect for international
legal norms bolsters this point. Unless one is prepared to
see violations of international law go unredressed, ought not
18 7
states be permitted to use force to remedy such wrongs?
discussing the Iranian hostage crisis, that reprisals are illegal under he
Charter).
181. U.S. v. Iran, 1980 I.CJ. at 43 (emphasis added).
182. Ido
183. Id at 51, 56-57 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
184. Id
185. Id at 58, 64-65.
186. See the text of Article 51, supra note 13.
187. SeeJ. STONE, OF LAW, supra note 23, at 24-35; cf. Reisman, Coercon
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The idea is appealing, but before concluding that policy argues for a contrary result to that permitted by law, further
analysis is required. The following subsections examine
some of the prevalent policy justifications for the legal position on reprisals.
1. Reprisals Risk Initiation of Conflict
It can be argued that permitting reprisals might lead to
full-scale conflict between the state taking the reprisal and
the one against which the reprisal is directed. 8 8 Clearly, a
full-scale conflict would not result if the state taking the reprisal were much stronger than the one against which it was
directed. In such situations, the potential for abuse arises. 189
But potential abuse seems more a problem with respect to
how the right, if acknowledged, is exercised, than with
whether it should exist. Also, there may be circumstances
involving the superpowers in which a violation of an international obligation will create a military disequilibrium which a
reprisal might readjust. With the relative balance of military
forces restored, the futility of an unbridled military conflict
will most likely serve to deter any response which could lead
to tit-for-tat escalation.' 90 For example, to the extent that a
targeted state's reprisals against objects or activities violative
of international law restore the rough equivalence of military
forces by rendering inoperative or removing threatening
military hardware or personnel, the prospect of a nuclear exchange in which neither side could prevail would seem to deter any disproportionately severe military response. Finally,
although international public opinion plays a limited role in
influencing the behavior of nations, widespread international
support for reprisals designed to remove objects or termiand Self-Determination: Construing ChapterArticle 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642,
643 (1984) (arguing against "automatic indiscriminate denunciations of
unilateral resorts to coercion by states as violative of Article 2(4)" and proposing development of criteria for appraising the lawfulness of such actions).
188. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 23, at 208 n.193; cf.
Schachter, supra note 178, at 649 (same proposition in connection with use
of force to promote democratic regimes).
189. Schachter, supra note 178, at 650.
190. But see Waldock, supra note 23, at 459 (arguing that reprisals between powerful states will lead to war).
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nate activities violative of international law may cause decisionmakers contemplating a response to such reprisals to
pause and reflect on how a response would be received by
the international community.
2.

Exceptions Erode FundamentalPrinciples

A second policy argument supportive of the rule against
reprisals rests on the notion that it is important to avoid
fashioning derogations from any principle as fundamental as
that prohibiting non-defensive uses of force. The argument
might be that once scholars set about the task of suggesting
an exception to that prohibition, forces capable of slowly, yet
inexorably, eroding the esteem in which that prohibition is
held will be unleashed. Once unleashed, it would only be a
matter of time before these forces would result in the entire
prohibition being swallowed by exceptions, thus jeopardizing international peace.' 9 '
This argument attributes greater influence to the views
of international legal scholars than perhaps they are actually
accorded. The argument also fails to consider whether advocating the use of reprisals to remedy violations of international law may actually increase the observance of the violated legal standards. In that event, the beneficial effect of
increased observance may well outweigh any deleterious impact resulting from the advocacy of reprisals as an exception
to the general prohibition against the use of force. Mere advocacy can create an impression that one has the will to use
force. Although force may in fact never be used, the impression alone may be sufficient to deter violations of international commitments.
There is another, more weighty, objection to the argument that derogations from the principle prohibiting nondefensive uses of force should be avoided: any principle disallowing behavior that states are naturally inclined to exhibit
when legitimate security interests are threatened, may well
be ignored. If there is the slightest risk that this may be true,
it would seem important to consider whether preventing the
191. Cf. Schachter, supra note 178, at 650 (expressing concern over another scholar's suggestion that Article 2(4) not be read as prohibiting uses
of force to overthrow non-democratic regimes).
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establishment of such an exception would itself serve to
erode respect for other components of the principle.
An essential agreement in the observance of law is the
extent to which the law is perceived as being fair. If one
state suffers a violation of an international commitment relating to security, fairness would seem to dictate the availability of a remedy. To deny a remedy to the aggrieved state
may result in that state questioning the fairness of other
standards by which it is bound. Unless self-interest clearly
favors adherence
to those standards, respect for such may
1 92
well decline.
3.

Losing Ground

The third and final policy argument against reprisals is
that the mere enshrinement in the Charter of the prohibition
on the use of force, however ineffective and hortatory that
principle has become, may have served to deter some unacceptable state conduct in the past. To permit reprisals now,
because other states have taken and will continue to take reprisals, will merely increase the number of occasions when
force is used, and eventually cause the drifting away from the
norm of peaceful conduct of those nations that hitherto have
demonstrated their commitment to the prohibition on the
use of force.
The basic premise upon which this argument rests is difficult, if not impossible, to prove. True, if states have taken
and continue to take reprisals, a kind of centripetal force may
pull all states towards the use of reprisals. Most importantly,
however, it is still not at all clear that the benefit gained from
a flat prohibition on reprisals will outweigh the damage done
to international political stability. The prohibition may simply provide a spring-board for ideological rhetoric which
hardens feelings and poisons the entire international diplo193
matic environment.
If every time a justifiable reprisal is taken, an opposing
192. On the general idea that laws or rules perceived as unfair affect
one's view of other laws or rules, see H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 305 (1968); A. SINCLAIR, PROHIBITION: THE ERA OF EXCESS
214 (1962).
193. Cf.J. STONE, supra note 23, at 36-37 (making this point in response
to critics of his approach to interpreting Article 2(4)).
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international ideological bloc were to use it as a pretext to
raise Article 2(4) and rail against the motives of its adversary,
political feelings would become frayed, and the United Nations would become increasingly contentious. Thus, before
readily accepting any policy argument based on the extent of
unknown observance of the prohibition on reprisals, it would
be advisable to assess further whether the extent of observance clearly outweighs the risks involved.
V.

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OBLIGATION

A targeted state facing an imminent threat of attack as a
result of another state's military use of a transnational spatial
area may have immediate recourse to necessary and proportionate measures of self-defense whenever all means short of
the use of force have proven incapable of eliminating the
threat.' 9 4 This is so because the customary right of anticipatory self-defense appears to have survived the Charter's passage, and because under the traditional formulation of that
right, anticipatory self-defense may be invoked whenever a

threat leaves "no choice of means." 1 9 5
The customary right of reprisal, however, included a
peaceful settlement requirement as a precondition to its invocation.1 9 6 As stated in the 1928 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration, a legitimate reprisal is an act of self-help by an injured
state "responding after an unsatisfied demand" to another to
cease an act contrary to international law.19 7 Therefore, if a
state facing an imminent or less than imminent threat of attack is or should be entitled to take measures of reprisal, the
appropriate procedures of peaceful settlement become important. In any case, since it is likely that a state apprehensive over another state's violative use of a transnational spatial area will initially attempt to resolve the matter without
194. On the resort to peaceful means once an attack has begun, see
Schachter, Right of States, supra note 45, at 1635 ("to require a state to

allow an invasion to proceed without resistance on the ground that peaceful settlement should be sought first, would, in effect, nullify the right of
self-defense"). But cf. Mallison & Mallison, supra note 68, at 419-20, 42729.
195. See supra text accompanying note 56.
196. Waldock, supra note 23, at 460.
197. See supra note 141.
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resort to force, familiarity with the procedures of peaceful
settlement commends itself.
A.

Chapter VI of the Charter

As discussed above, the basic principle of peaceful resolution of international disputes is set forth in Article 2(3) of
the Charter. Article 33 of Chapter VI of the Charter elaborates on that principle by obligating the parties to "any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security," to seek a
solution through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or any similar means. 1a
If such efforts prove unsuccessful, the parties are obligated
to refer the matter to the Security Council. 10 9
Article 34 provides that the Security Council "may" conduct an investigation of "any dispute" to determine whether
the continuance of the dispute is likely to endanger the main-

tenance of international peace and security.2 00 This author-

198. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. Article 33 states:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call
upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
Id. art. 33.
199. Id. art. 37, para. 1. Article 37 reads:
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in
Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article,
they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the
dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action
under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it
may consider appropriate.
Id. art. 37.
200. Article 34 states:
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
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ity is surely broad enough to encompass Article 33 disputes

referred to the Council by the parties. If, however, the parties to the dispute fail to refer the matter, any United Nations
member can exercise the Article 35 right to call the dispute

"to the attention" of the Council, and engage the Security

Council's investigative prerogative. 20 1 If the Council determines that continuance of the dispute is "in fact" likely to

endanger international peace and security, it is obligated to
decide whether to recommend appropriate procedures or

methods of adjustment under Article 36,202 or appropriate
terms of settlement under Article
204

37.20 3

Recommendations

in both cases are non-binding.
The parties to a "situation" (as opposed to a dispute)
the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainteId art. 34.
201. Id. art. 35, para. 1. Article 35 states:
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to
the attention of the Security Coundil or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may
bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General
Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance,
for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of
matters brought to itsattention under this Article will be subject
to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Id. art. 35. The Security Coundil may begin an investigation on its
own initiative. See infra text accompanying note 213.
202. Article 36 states:
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the
nature referred to in Article 33 or of a siuation of like nature,
recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council shall take into consideration any

procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already
been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes

should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court ofJustice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court.

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 36.

203. Id. art. 37, para. 2; see supra note 199.
204. L. GoODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. StIMONS, supra note 37, at 284; see
U.N. CHARTER art. 37, para. 1, supra note 199.
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nance of international peace and security20 5 have no Article
33 obligation to seek a negotiated settlement. 206 Though
neither term is defined, a "situation," unlike a "dispute,"
does not involve differing positions concerning the continuation of a specific state of affairs, or differing positions based
on conflicting claims about the actual facts or attendant legal
consequences.
The broad language of Article 34 indicates that a situation of the nature referred to above may serve as a basis for
207
invoking the Security Council's investigative authority.
Article 35(1)'s reference to "[a]ny member" suggests that
the invocation could even come about as a result of the request of a party to the
situation bringing the matter to the
20 8
Council's attention.
The Security Council need not complete its investigation before exercising its authority under Article 36(1) to
"recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment," as this may be done "at any stage." 20 9 Recommendations under Article 37(2) concerning appropriate "terms of
settlement," however, may be made only when the Council is
faced with a "dispute" the continuance of which is likely to
endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security. 2 10 Furthermore, "situations" the continuance of which
are likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security are not included under the provisions of
Article 37(2).211 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether Articles
205. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 36, para. 1 refers to a "situation" of a nature

similar to a "dispute" as defined in Article 33 (i.e., "the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security"). See supra note 202.
206. Yet there have been instances where such "situations" have led to
the use of Article 33 procedures. Whether use of these procedures was
required is unclear. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note
37, at 260-61.
207. U.N. CHARTER art. 34 speaks of "any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute." See supra note 200.
208. See supra note 201.
209. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 1; see supra note 202.
210. But see L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 37, at 28687 (indicating that the Council has used its Article 37 authority with regard to some matters submitted as "situations").
211. Thus, Article 36 "situations," see supra note 202, are not included
under Article 37(2). U.N. CHARTER art. 37, para. 2; see supra note 199.
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36(1) and 37(2) preclude the Council from doing more to
settle peacefully a situation than simply recommending procedural strategems.
Aside from disputes or situations "likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security," Chapter
VI also details procedural steps which may be used to address, in the words of Article 34, "any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to
a dispute." 2 12 Disputes or situations of this sort are subject
to investigation on the Security Council's own motion in order to determine whether they are likely to endanger international peace and security. 213 They are not sufficiently
ingrave, however, to impose an obligation on the parties
2 14
volved to seek resolution through Article 33 methods.
As mentioned in connection with both disputes and situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security, Article 35 grants to members of the
United Nations the authority to bring to the attention of the
Security Council a broad range of issues, including "any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article
34."215 If a Council investigation does not find a dispute
likely to endanger international peace and security, the
Council has no authority to recommend terms of settlement,2 16 nor to recommend procedures or methods of adjustment.2 17 It may make such recommendations, however,
and all the parif the matter involved constitutes a "dispute"
2 18
ties to the dispute request Council action.
212. U.N. CHAm-R art. 34; see supra note 200.
213. Id.
214. Cf L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note

37, at 260
(noting that Article 33 applies only to a "dispute, the continuance of which
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security").
215. For the complete text of Article 35 of the U.N. Charter, see supra
note 201.
216. U.N. CHARTER art. 37, para. 2; see supra note 199.
217. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 1; see supra note 202.
218. Article 38 states:
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the
Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request,
make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
U.N. CHRTER art. 38.
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A Chapter VI dispute or situation may develop into a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."219 This might occur if the pace of events outstripped
the pace of settlement efforts under Chapter VI, or if the Security Council is unable to act, or, assuming it does act, if its
recommendations are ignored or prove insufficient and the
dispute or situation continues. In all of these cases, Article
39, the opening provision of Chapter VII,22 ° obligates the
Council to "make recommendations, or decide what meas'
ures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42. t221
The measures contemplated under Articles 41 and 42 range
222
from diplomatic or economic pressure to armed force.
The seriousness of a Security Council action, especially
one taken under Chapter VII, 2 23 raises the possibility that a
219. Article 39 states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id art. 39.
220. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter contains provisions which enable
the Security Council to take certain actions in response to threats to the
peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. These include the
issuance of recommendations and provisional measures, and the imposition of economic sanctions. The Chapter also establishes the enforcement
power of the Council.
221. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; see supra note 219.
222. Article 41 reads:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Article 42 reads:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and
other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations.
Id. art. 42.
223. See supra note 220.
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permanent member will paralyze the Council by exercising
its veto power. A veto would be likely in the event that the
superpowers disagreed on the military use of a transnational
spatial area. Because a veto would thus render the United
Nations unable to end the violation, the question of the continued existence of the customary right to reprisal may be
crucial.
B.

Peaceful Settlement Provisions of Arms ControlAgreements

The United Nations Charter is not the only source of
peaceful settlement procedures. The international agreements that would be violated by military uses of transnational spatial areas 224 also contain peaceful settlement procedures of their own. Indeed, Article 36(2) of the Charter
urges the Security Council not to intervene prematurely, but
procedures contained
rather to employ fully the settlement
22 5
first.
agreements
these
of
all
in
The international agreements involved can be divided
according to the spatial areas they govern. For problems in
outer space, the general rule is to obligate states parties to
consult one another whenever one party has engaged in conduct that another claims is of questionable legality.2 2 6 While
such a claim would imply the existence of a dispute, under
the relevant international agreements there is no obligation
parallel to the obligation of Article 33 of the Charter, since
the Article 33 obligation is triggered by a dispute which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security. How consultations tailored for disputes regarding the use of outer space should be conducted is not
224. See supra notes 2-15 and accompanying text.
225. Seegenerally L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMIONS, supra note 37. at

279.
226. SALT II, supra note 8, art. XVII, para. 2(a); see ABM Treaty, supra
note 2, art. XIII, para. 1(a); Moon Treaty, supra note 12, art. XV. But see
OST, supra note 10, art. IX (requiring consultations before a "state party"
undertakes activities which may create "harmful interference with activities of other States Parties"). The draft Anti-Satellite Treaty, supra note
12, art. IV, para. 3, is not clearly in this category. It refers to consultations

"whenever necessary." For discussion of Article 33 obligations, see supra
notes 198-99 & 205-06 and accompanying text.
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clearly defined. 22 7 The newly-adopted Moon Treaty, however, requires that consultations proceed "without delay"
and seek a resolution both "mutually acceptable" and in
keeping with the "rights and interests of all States Parties." 2 28 If consultations cannot produce such a result, the
parties must then attempt other means of peaceful resolution. 22 9 Failure to reach a meeting of the minds entitles any
party to seek the assistance of the Secretary-General of the
230
United Nations.
A similar obligation to consult exists for disputes in the
Antarctic. 23 ' Established by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the
obligation applies to "any dispute. . between two or more
. . .contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application" of the Convention. 23 2 It does not, however, bind
members of the world community who are not states parties.
Reflecting the influence of the Charter's Article 33, the
Antarctic Treaty's obligation to consult is aimed at dispute
resolution through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement.23 3 If a resolution
through such means is impossible, the dispute must be referred to the International Court of Justice, 2 34 provided that
2 35
all parties to the dispute consent to the referral.
An obligation on state parties to consult on matters concerning the oceans was not incorporated into a convention
provision until the 1970s. 23 6 At that time, several members
227. See, e.g., Moon Treaty, supra note 12, art. XV; ABM Treaty, supra
note 2, art. XIII, para. l(a).
228. Moon Treaty, supra note 12, art. XV, para. 2.
229. Id art. XV, para. 3.
230. Id.
231. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 11, art. XI.
232. Id.
233. Id. art. XI, para. 1.
234. Id. art. XI, para. 2.
235. Id.
236. Neither the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 5, nor
the 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 5, contains any obligation to
consult. The same U.N. Conference which prepared those two Conventions, however, also prepared an Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/
L.57, reprintedin 2 First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
145, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/38 (1958). But the Protocol only binds the
approximately forty nations that have signed it. The United States Senate
refused to give its advise and consent to the Protocol and, therefore, the
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of the world community agreed that when "reasonable
doubts" arose regarding whether a state party was using the
ocean floor for prohibited military purposes, the presumed
using state would be obligated to consult with the other
states parties involved with an eye towards removing their
doubts. 2 37 If consultation did not alleviate the doubts, any
party entertaining such doubt would be obligated to notify
the other concerned parties, and all parties concerned would
then be obligated to cooperate on "such further procedures
for verification as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities
that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind... [prohibited]." 23 8 These verification procedures can also be initiated
without prior consultation when the state party responsible
for the violation cannot be identified and refuses to step forward. 23 9 If, after consultation and inspection, a state party is
unable to alleviate its doubts, it can, "in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations," refer the
2 40
matter to the Security Council.
The proposed 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 24 1 would extend and elaborate considerably
the existing legal regime of mandatory consultation concerning use of the oceans. Part XV of the Convention obligates
states parties to consult with one another whenever they
concerning the interpretation or aphave "any dispute.
plication" of the Convention. 2 42 Once a dispute arises, the
parties must "proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views
regarding its settlement" through negotiation or other
peaceful means as set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. 24 3 If these means are unsuccessful, any party to the dispute may request that the dispute be submitted to one of the
United States is not bound by its terms. See 12 M. WHrrIEMN, supra note

170, at 1332-33.
237. See SACT, supra note 9, art. III, para. 2.
238. Id
239. Id art. III, para. 3.
240. Id art. III, para. 4.
241. LOS Convention, supra note 6.
242. Id art. 279.
243. Id art. 283, para. 1. Article 283(1)'s reference to peaceful means of
settlement draws on Article 279. Its language also suggests the peaceful
settlement methods of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
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several entities expressly provided for in the Convention and
selected by the parties to the dispute at the time of their signature, ratification or accession, or at any time thereafter. 244
Under the proposed Convention, a settlement decree issued
either by an appropriate entity selected by the parties or by
an arbitral body which the Convention deems to have been
245
selected, is binding on all parties to the dispute.
Some disputes relating to the exclusive economic zone
(hereinafter EEZ) have been exempted implicitly by the
terms of the Convention. But of those disputes subject to
mandatory settlement, the most important for purposes of
this Article concern those dealing with a coastal state's "exercise" of sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the EEZ, when
the coastal state or another state is alleged to have violated
Convention provisions "in regard to the freedoms and rights
of navigation, overflight, or the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines, or other internationally lawful uses of the sea"
specified in the Convention. 246 Such disputes remain subject
to compulsory settlement. It should be noted, however, that
any dispute involving a military use may be exempted from
compulsory settlement if either party to the dispute has exercised the
Convention's optional exception for military activi7
ties.

24

C. Assessment of Peaceful Settlement Mechanisms in Context of
Military Use of TransnationalSpatial Areas

As discussed above, the existence of a right of reprisal as
a self-help measure to remedy violations of international law
is questionable. Yet, if one argues that policy reasons suggest that such a right should exist, a state wishing to use selfhelp, in order to avoid further violations of legal standards,
244. Id. art. 286 & art. 287, para. 1. When one or both parties have

made no selection, or when their selections differ, the dispute must be
submitted to arbitration. Id. art. 287, paras. 3 & 5. Para. 3 discusses instances when no selection of entities has been made; para. 5 refers to instances of conflicting selections.
245. Id. art. 296 & Annex VII, art. 11.
246. Id. art. 297, para. 1 (a).
247. Id. art. 298, paras. 1 (b) & 3. See generally Janis, Dispute Settlement in
the Law of the Sea Convention: The Military Activities Exception, 4 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L

L. 51 (1977).
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must consider the peaceful settlement procedures of both
the Charter and the relevant international conventions regulating military uses of transnational spatial areas. How these
procedures are likely to operate in the event that any of the
four factual situations set forth in the introduction above
come into play is worthy of attention. 248 To reiterate, these
situations involve:
1. military hardware left unprotected by the deploying state and subject to clandestine removal;
2. hardware considered important enough to
the deploying state that efforts by the targeted state
to remove the state's hardware are likely to encounter resistance;
3. hardware or activities that the targeted state
lacks the technological sophistication or military
wherewithal to remove or terminate; and
4. ongoing uses which require that the state engaging in the uses employ armed forces or military
equipment to achieve complete implementation.
1. The United Nations Charter
In each of the hypotheticals presented above, any claim
by the targeted state that the military use violates a binding
international commitment will likely be met with a categorical denial by the state engaging in the military use based on
the facts of the case or applicable law. Under the terms of
Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter249 , such a denial
creates a "dispute." If the dispute is one "the continuance
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," then the mandatory settlement
procedures of Article 33 will be triggered.250 In this context,
a military use which results in a potentially destabilizing strategic advantage for the using state might be considered to
248. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
249. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter sets procedures for the
peaceful settlement of disputes between member states. See supra note 17.
250. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1;seesupra note 198. In addition, many
of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter are sufficiently broad that a
targeted state may use their settlement procedures without first submitting
a representation of violation to the using state. See ifra text accompanying notes 261-64.
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create an Article 33 dispute.2 51 Under such a scenario, the
targeted state might take rash action to restore the military
equilibrium, or the using state itself might grow intolerant of
the targeted state's claims of illegality. Since under Article
33 it is the dispute itself, rather than the underlying facts giving rise to it, that must be likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, even a military use
which would have the effect of restoring the military balance

may trigger Article

33.252

Thus, whether the targeted state

seeks to remove the military objects left unprotected by the
deploying state, 2 53 or engages in some other form of retaliatory activity either because it is incapable of removing the
violative hardware or because it is unwilling to risk military
engagement, Article 33 is relevant.
Should a using state answer challenges to the legality of
its use by declaring that the military use will continue, Article
33 again controls.2 5 4 Article 33's reference to a "dispute"
covers "any" dispute likely to endanger international peace
and security. 25 5 That neither state's position may relate to
the meaning or effect of legal principles which regulate the
use involved is immaterial. Similarly, the absence of conflicting claims over the facts surrounding the use is not significant. As long as the states concerned have opposing views
on the continued use, Article 33's requirement of "any" dispute is satisfied. The representation evidences targeted state
objection to the use. The admission of the using state, coupled with continued use, thus indicates that a "dispute" exists.
In any case, the targeted state is entitled to exercise its
Article 35(1) right to bring the matter to the Security Council for appropriate action 2 56 whenever the states fail to re251. Id. art. 33; see supra note 198.
252. Id.
253. If removal in this context is seen as not involving the use of
"force," see supra text accompanying notes 27-28, reprisal and its corresponding "peaceful settlement" obligation are irrelevant. Moreover, the
settlement obligation is not triggered prior to clandestine removal. Only
after removal is discovered might a "dispute" arise that obligates the
targeted state to settle peacefully.

254. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 33.

255. Id.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 201-08.
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solve the dispute as required under Article 33.257 The Council is then authorized by Article 34 to investigate the dispute. 25 8 Articles 36(1) and 37(2) authorize the Council to
issue non-binding recommendations on the procedures or
methods of adjustment the parties should use, or on the
terms of settlement considered appropriate. 25 9 If the disit may then merit consideration
pute cannot be resolved,
26 0
under Chapter VII.
The broad language of Chapter VI permits a targeted
state to use the settlement procedures of the Chapter without first having to submit a representation of violation to the
using state. The submission of a representation only provides the opportunity for an Article 33 "dispute" to arise.
Since the maintenance of international peace and security
may be endangered whether or not a state undertaking a violative military use gains a strategic advantage, the absence of
a representation of violation may simply mean that the matter is a "situation of like nature" 26 1 (i.e., likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security), or a
"situation which might lead to international friction."2 6 2 In
either case, the targeted state would thereby be entitled to
exercise its Article 35(1) right to bring the matter to the Security Council for appropriate action.2 63 Even if there are
instances where international friction might not result, the
right to bring the matter to the Security Council's attention
give rise to a disapplies to any "situation which might.
pute." 26 4 And, unless a targeted state were unconcerned
about violations of arms control commitments, a military use
of a transnational spatial area would almost always give rise
to such a dispute. Invariably, if a targeted state cannot terminate violative activities or remove violative objects, it will
submit a representation to the using state. As long as the
257. U.N. CHARTER art. 35.

258. See supra text accompanying notes 255-56.
259. See text of Article 33, supra note 198.
260. Since clandestine removal does not involve a "dispute," peaceful
settlement under Article 33 would not be triggered. See supra note 250.
261. U.N. CIARTER art. 36, para. 1.
262. Id art. 34.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 205-08.
264. U.N. CHmTER art. 34.
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using state refuses to accede to a request, a dispute is sure to
arise.
A "dispute" likely to endanger international peace invokes all of the Security Council's powers. If the matter is
merely a "situation" likely to endanger international peace,
the Council's investigative power is augmented by its power
to recommend resolution procedures or methods of adjustment. 2 65 Moreover, a "situation which might lead to international friction" or a "situation which might give rise to a dispute" leaves the Council's investigative power standing
alone. Even situations of this sort, however, may develop
into threats to international peace, and trigger the Security
Council's powers under Chapter VII.266
2.

The Arms ControlAgreements

What about the peaceful settlement procedures set forth
in the international conventions violated by the military use
of a transnational spatial area? These conventions provide
for mandatory consultation and settlement procedures that
may be triggered merely by concern over whether convention commitments are being observed. A dispute, as such, is
not essential. Moreover, for the settlement procedures to be
employed, a suspected violation need not be likely to endanger international peace, or to raise the specter of international friction. Thus, the settlement obligation set forth in
the relevant conventions is more easily triggered than the
corresponding obligation of the Charter. There are two instances, however, in which a dispute is required before the
settlement procedures are triggered. Both Article XI of the
1959 Antarctic Treaty and Article 279 of the proposed 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea require
"any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application" of the respective convention. 26 7 But unlike Article 33
of the Charter, neither Article XI nor Article 279 requires a
268
dispute that is likely to endanger international peace.
265. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 36, para. 1.

266. See supra notes 220-23.
267. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 5 UNCLOS at
45, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982); Antarctic Treaty, supra note 11,
art. XI.
268. See supra note 198.
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A state using a transnational spatial area for military
purposes cannot avoid the Article 33 obligation merely by
coupling its refusal to discontinue its military use with an admission of a violation. The refusal creates a dispute, and
"any" dispute the continuation of which is likely to endanger
269
international peace triggers the Article 33 obligation.
Under Article XI and Article 279, however, the same conclusion may not be reached. Although a refusal may create a
dispute, an admission by the state engaging in the military
use that the targeted state has accurately stated both the
revelant facts and the controlling law may prevent the dispute from being one "concerning the interpretation or application" of the relevant convention. Admissions of this sort
are unlikely. They may arise, however, if the targeted state is
perceived by the using state as either unable to end the use,
or is perceived by that state as unwilling to run the risks of
attempting to do so.
Such an admission by a using state would raise a basic
question: does the phrase "concerning the interpretation or
application" refer to a dispute about whether a relevant provision has a particular interpretation or is applicable to the
facts at issue, or does it refer to a dispute arising from or
having a basis in a particular provision, as interpreted and
applied to the specific facts? The former reading would facilitate any effort of a deploying state to avoid the relevant conventions' resolution mechanisms, while the latter reading
would prevent such an approach from being successful. Several reasons suggest that the latter reading is more persuasive.
First, the inclusion of dispute resolution mechanisms
within an international convention that contains specific proscriptions reflects an intention of the drafters to submit all
disputes related to those proscriptions to the enumerated
mechanisms. To allow acknowledged violative military acivity to continue without requiring the using state to submit to
the dispute resolution procedures would circumvent this intent.
Second, the terms of a convention should be given their
"ordinary meaning," unless it is clear that the drafters in269. See U.N. CHARmR art. 33.
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tended a different meaning.2 70 Thus, to the extent that dictionary definitions reflect ordinary meaning, "concerning" is
synonomous with "relating to." 2 71 The term "concerning" is
arguably broader than "about," and includes disputes arising from or having a basis in a substantive provision of an
international convention.
Third, the French version of Article XI of the Antarctic
Treaty speaks of a dispute "concerne l'interpr6tation ou
'application." 2 72 Had the French version been intended to
convey the narrower concept of a dispute "about" the interpretation or application of a convention, it might have read
"dpropos de l'interpretation ou l'application."
Fourth, the travaux priparatoires of Article 279 of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention indicate that the drafters
preferred the term "concerning" to the phrases "relating to"
or "arising out of." In almost every provision of Part XV
("Settlement of Disputes") in which "concerning" now appears, the drafts of Part XV of the proposed 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention used either "relating to" or "arising out
of." 27 3 Since the travauxpriparatoiresdo not include any suggestion that the change to "concerning" had a substantive
effect, perhaps none should be implied.
270. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27, art. 31 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875
(1969); Interpretation of the 1919 Convention Concerning Employment
of Women During the Night, 1932 P.C.IJ., ser. A/B, No. 50, at 17 (Judgment of Nov. 15, 1932).
271. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 272 (9th ed.
1983).
272. Trait6 sur L'Antartique, Dec. 1, 1959, art. XI, No. 5778, 402
U.N.T.S. 72, 81 (emphasis added).
273. See Informal Single Negotiating Text art. 137, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/WP.8/Part II, reprinted in United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 4 UNCLOS at 171, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982);
Revised Single Negotiating Text art. 131, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/
Rev.I/Part II, reprinted in 5 UNCLOS at 172, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122
(1982); Informal Composite Negotiating Text arts. 279-84, 286-88 & 29697, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10/Add. 1, reprintedin 8 UNCLOS at 45-48,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982); Informal Composite Negotiating Text
Rev. I arts. 279-84, 286-88, 294, 296 & 298, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.10/Rev.1, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 686, 778-83 (1979); Draft of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) arts. 279-84, 286-88, 295,
297 & 298, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
1131, 1239-41, 1243-45 (1980).
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Finally, if the term "concerning" in the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention is interpreted to include only disputes about
a particular provision's interpretation or application to specific facts, disputes of any other sort would not be covered.
Yet the fact that Article 298(1)(c) of the Convention permits
parties to except from the compulsory settlement provisions
of Part XV disputes over which the Security Council exercises its powers under Chapter VI of the Charter certainly
274
suggests that "concerning" must have a broader meaning.
This stems from the fact that the Security Council's authority under Chapter VI includes disputes of many degrees
of intensity as well as disputes arising from many different
sources. 2 75 A dispute regarding the continuation of a military use violative of the 1982 Convention would surely be
included. If "concerning" were given its narrower technical
meaning, Article 298(1)(c)'s optional exception would be un2 76
necessary.
This discussion does not mean that there is no technical
difference between "relating to," "arising out of," and "concerning." In the context of Article XI of the Antarctic Treaty
and Article 279 of the proposed 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea, however, that technical difference appears
not to have been closely followed. Nor is the discussion
above intended to suggest that only disputes arising from or
connected with expectations about state party behavior are
within the ambit of "concerning the interpretation or application." Disputes about a particular provision's meaning or
its applicability to specific facts are also included under the
language. By giving the term "concerning" a broader reading, the intent of the drafters may be better effectuated, and
premature intervention by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter may be averted.

274. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 266,
at 49. For a discussion of the Security Council's authority over disputes
under Chapter VI of the Charter, see supra text accompanying notes 24966.
275. For discussion of peaceful settlement, see text accompanying notes
194-223.
276. This is because the dispute would not be within Part XV settlement
provisions.
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VI. ASSESSMENT OF CLAIMS THAT USE OF FORCE IS
JUSTIFIED: SPACE-BASED BMD AND CONTINENTAL
SHELF-BASED ASW SYSTEMS

Whether a state's violation of an international obligation
to refrain from deploying military objects or engaging in military activities in international spatial areas allows a targeted
state under the legal concepts discussed above to use force
to remove the objects or terminate the activities is of central
importance. If one is favorably disposed to a right of reprisal, 2 7 7 the factual situation created by the violative use will
determine whether a targeted state can justifiably invoke the
right, for as formulated under customary international law,
the doctrine of reprisal requires that any resort to force be
warranted by necessity. 2 78 Similarly, the facts of a specific
violative use are also important in assessing the right of anticipatory self-defense. As The Carolineincident makes clear,
the use of force in anticipation of an armed attack may be
justified only if the attack is imminent, "leaving... no moment for deliberation." 2 79 The lower degree of necessity re277. See, e.g., II L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, at 136 (non-compliance
with treaty obligations may justify a reprisal).
278. For example, the opinion in the Naulilaa Incident Arbitration, supra
note 141, at 904, states: "The use of force is only justified by its character
of necessity." The opinion rejected Germany's plea that it had used force
as a measure of reprisal, on three grounds: first, Germany was not tile
victim of an internationally unlawful act; second, even if it had been a victim, Germany had made no request for satisfaction prior to using force;
and third, the force Germany employed was out of proportion to the act
triggering its use. Id. It is difficult to know exactly in what sense the case
intended there to be a necessity. The arbitrators may have meant that the
necessity to use force exists (a) anytime peaceful settlement fails; (b) only
when the situation, after unsuccessful attempts at peaceful settlement,
poses a threat to the state invoking the right of retaliation; or (c) only
when the threat is so acute that it cannot be removed by other means. In
view of the grounds for decision, it seems strained to read the opinion to
mean that the international delinquency must have created a threat so
acute that no other means existed by which the threat could be avoided.
In all likelihood, the arbitrators meant only that Germany was required to
exhaust peaceful settlement efforts before it would be justified in using
force to remedy the violation it suffered. For present purposes, however,
the arbitrators' ruling may be and has been read as falling between these
two extremes and as requiring the failure of peaceful settlement coupled
with a threat to the invoking state.
279. Jennings, supra note 56, at 90; see Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr.
Fox, supra note 56.
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quired to invoke the right of reprisal suggests one reason the
right has not been well received in international law. In any
case, a targeted state may not justify the use of force under
either the right of reprisal or the right of anticipatory selfdefense unless the factual situation created by the violative
use satisfies the appropriate standard.
The following sections will examine the legal validity of
reprisals and anticipatory self-defense measures in the context of two possible future military uses: the deployment by
the United States of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system
in outer space, and the placement of anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) devices by the Soviet Union on the United States'
continental shelf.
A.

"Star Wars" A Dfficult Casefor the Anticipatory Use of
Force by the Soviet Union

1. Space-Based BMD Systems
In a nationally televised address on March 23, 1983,
President Ronald Reagan outlined a defensive alternative to
the current U.S.-U.S.S.R. offensive arms race.2 8 0 The Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" program, is intended
to examine the technological feasibility of a space-based
BMD system capable of providing the United States with a
shield against Soviet ballistic missiles.
As presently conceived, the system is composed of three
distinct layers. 2 1 Each layer would attack Soviet ballistic
missiles at different phases-the boost, the mid-course, and
the terminal phases-of their flight towards targets in the
United States. 282 The boost phase includes the 200 to 300
seconds immediately following the lift-off of Soviet ICBMs
and SLBMs. 283 During this phase, directed-energy weapons
able to strike at the speed of light would be used to destroy
280. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at A20, col. 5.

281. Burrows, supra note 1, at 847-48. Changes in the contours of the
space-based BMD proposal formulated after the latter half of 1984 are not
considered in this Article.
282. Id.
283. D. GRAH , supra note 1, at 115 (240 seconds); Andelman, supra
note 130, at 96 (250 seconds); Burrows, supra note I, at 848 (300 seconds);
Weiner, supra note 1, at 91 (200 seconds).
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or disable Soviet launchers.2 8 4
Soviet launchers not destroyed in the boost phase would
release multiple warheads on various trajectories aimed at
individual targets. These warheads would be targeted during the mid-course phase by the second layer of U.S. weapons. The difficulty of destroying all of the warheads at this
phase would depend upon the number of Soviet launchers
able to escape destruction during the boost phase and the
number of warheads carried by those launchers. 28 5 The midcourse phase will last approximately
20 minutes for
28 7
ICBMs 28 6 and 10 minutes for SLBMs.

The terminal phase begins as the warheads re-enter the
earth's atmosphere. During this phase, which may last only a

few minutes, warheads which survived the mid-phase defensive weaponry would have to be destroyed at nearly pointblank range by earth-based BMD systems. Possible system
components include nuclear-tipped rockets, 28 8 multiple unguided Swarmjet non-nuclear rockets, 28 9 large fragmenta-

tion warheads, 290 and nuclear charges which are planted

around ICBM fields and detonated so as to neutralize incom2 91
ing warheads with clouds of dust and debris.
The directed-energy weapons used in this three layer

BMD system would most likely be either high energy lasers
284. Estimates of the number of space-based directed-energy weapons
needed in this phase vary from 24, see C. GRAY, supra note 1, at 60, to 250,
see Carter, supra note 1, at 175; see also Weiner, supra note 1, at 94 (at least
200 satellites); Letters to the Editor, Wall St.J.,Jan. 17, 1985, at 27, col. I
(Union of Concerned Scientists suggests 300 satellites).
285. In addition to directed-energy weapons, mid-course phase weaponry may include: a) hypervelocity electromagnetic railguns able to fire
dense fusillades of lethal pellets at extraordinary speeds, see Burrows, supra
note 1, at 848; and b) non-nuclear exo-atmospheric multiple warhead interceptor rockets, operating in conjunction with exo-atmospheric infrared
optical sensors able to direct each interceptor warhead to an independent
incoming ICBM/SLBM warhead, see Payne & Gray, supra note 1, at 823;
Weiner, supra note 1, at 75-85.
286. Burrows, supra note 1, at 848; Weiner, supra note 1, at 51 (Fig. 3-1).
287. Weiner, supra note 1, at 51 (Fig. 3-1).
288. The nuclear-tipped rockets might be of the Sprint variety used in
the U.S. BMD system in the late 1960s. Burrows, supra note 1, at 848.
289. D. GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 46.
290. Id.
291. Weiner, supra note 1, at 89-91.
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or particle beam weapons. 2 92 Both require a power-generating source, and beam and fire control subsystems. 293 The
beam and fire control subsystems would aim and focus the
beam at a vulnerable spot on the target,2 94 and cease firing
once the objective has been accomplished 2 95 in order that
the weapon could be immediately resighted. The objective
in each case would be to penetrate the target surface and
ignite the fuel, destroy or damage a vital component, or
cause a warhead to detonate. 2 96 A single high energy laser
or particle beam weapon functioning at an optimum level
would be capable of destroying only 40 to 60 missiles during
2 97
boost phase.
High energy lasers operate by projecting either a continuous beam of light or a series of energy pulses. 29 8 In a "continuous beam" mode, laser-generated heat burns through
the target surface,29 9 while in the pulse mode, shock waves
are generated in the target surface.3 0 0 A particle beam
292. Burrows, supra note 1, at 847.

293. D. GiAMH.,
ons).

supra note 1, at 115 (lasers), 118 (particle beam weap-

294. Id
295. I&
296. Id. at 116 (lasers), 119 (particle beam weapons).

297. Carter, supra note 1, at 175. This estimate is based on the operafional range of the BMD system weapons and enough time for the beam to
"dwell" on the target. An operational range of 1000 miles has been suggested for high energy lasers, see C. GRAY, supra note 1, at 60-61, and
10,000 kilometers for particle beam weapons, see D. GRAu-Ai, supra note 1,
at 119. A satisfactory beam dwell time has been established at approximately 5 seconds per target. Carter, supra note 1, at 174. "Laser" is an
acronym for Light Amplification by Simulated Emission of Radiation.
298. Thompson, supra note 1, at 698.
299. Ia300. I- High energy lasers take a number of different forms. The most
technologically developed high energy laser, see C. GRAY,supra note 1,at
61, is the hydrogen flouride laser. It is not considered sufficiently promising for BMD missions in the 1990s. Id. The deuterium fluoride chemical
laser, the most powerful chemical laser to date, is subject to the same observation. See D. GRAH1m, supra note 1, at 117-18. Other types of lasers
currently under development may, however, prove to produce sufficient
power. For example, a free electron laser able to produce moderate
power levels is due to be completed in the mid-1980s. D. GRLAHsi, supra
note 1, at 118. Research into the ultraviolet excimer laser is progressing
much more slowly. C. GRAY,supra note 1, at 61. Nuclear-pumped x-ray
lasers, although under research at one laboratory, see Burrows, supra note

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LA W AND POLITICS

[Vol. 17:73

weapon, on the other hand, produces a beam of either
charged or neutral subatomic particles and then accelerates
those particles and projects them to a target in a form best
described as a man-made lightening bolt. As the particles
strike the target surface they transfer intense kinetic energy
50
which results in targeted material fracturing from stress. '
The major technological hurdle to deploying particle beam
weapons in space is decreasing the size of current particle
accelerators while increasing the energy they are able to generate and project. Currently, ground-based particle accelerators are a mile or more in length and do not produce suffi02
cient energy to serve as effective defensive weapons.3
Some commentators suggest that the necessary breakthroughs in particle beam weaponry are not likely to occur
before the end of this century.3 0 3
2.

Should "Star Wars" Be Deployed?

Assuming that technological impediments can be overcome, the decision to proceed with deployment of the "Star
Wars" system must take into account a number of policy
considerations. For instance, to what extent would efforts to
deploy a space-based BMD system drive Soviet decisionmakers, unable to keep their own technology abreast of
America's, to order a nuclear strike against the United States
during a crisis arising prior to the BMD system being made
operational? Facing a new generation of American ICBMs,
SLBMs, and long-range bombers, it does not seem unrealistic to imagine Soviet decisionmakers viewing a space-based
BMD system with great trepidation and wondering whether
time will blunt the ability of their retaliatory forces to discourage attacks against their nation. The likelihood of such
a Soviet attack might be reduced by deploying the earth1, at 848, may not be a critical component in any space-based BMD system
in the near future. See Payne & Gray, supra note 1, at 837 n.14 (citing G.
Keyworth, Presentation at the Forum on the Future of Ballistic Missile Defense, Brookings Institution (Feb. 29, 1984)); see also D. GRAHAM, supra
note 1, at 118.
301. The particle beam has been an integral part of efforts to replace
present-day fission nuclear reactors with fusion ones. D. GRAHAM, supra
note 1, at 119; Thompson, supra note 1, at 698.
302. C. GRAY, supra note 1, at 58.
303. Id.
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based components of the BMD system first. Such a move
would make it more difficult for the Soviets to destroy American ICBMs, thereby reducing the likelihood of a Soviet firststrike.
But what if the Soviets match every American technological advancement with an advancement of their own? If the
"Star Wars" program simply ignites a weapons race in outer
space, will that lead to more widespread confrontation on
earth at the conventional forces level? Conventional conflict
between the superpowers has been conducted through surrogates, principally out of the fear that more direct or frequent conflict might escalate to nuclear war.s3 4 If the stage
for the ultimate battle between the two superpowers is to be
outer space, who can say whether the lifting of the threat of
widespread devastation on earth might not remove the basic
constraint (fear of nuclear war on earth) that has kept more
conventional confrontation at a tolerable level.
In assessing the choice between war in outer space with
its accompanying possibility of a greater chance of conventional conflict on earth, and the constant and looming threat
of nuclear annihilation with its accompanying possibility of a

smaller chance of conventional

confliCt, 3 0 5

one must not lose

sight of the fact that there is no guarantee that conventional
conflict will remain conventional. Further, unless spacebased defensive systems are in fact fail-proof, the likelihood
of full nuclear destruction may thus be dramatically increased by a move to outer space.
3.

Assessment

The considerations discussed above draw into question
the wisdom of proceeding with deployment of a space-based
BMD system, but have little to do with the lawfulness of Soviet efforts to remove the components of such a BMD system
once deployed. Such an effort by the Soviets would seem to
involve the use of force and would therefore require justification under an exceptional principle.
304. The superpowers probably recognize that indirect and infrequent

confrontation at the conventional level reduces the chances of escalation
to greater levels of conflict between them.
305. See F. DYSON, WEAPONS AND HOPE 71-72 (1984) (discussing a par-

ticular kind of situation in which he would accept space-based BMD).
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A Soviet effort to interrupt the deployment process may
involve clashes with American deployment personnel.
Where such personnel are not present, either because they
are not needed to complete the deployment or because the
BMD system is already operating, Soviet efforts are sure to
be detected by space surveillance systems. In both cases, it
probably will not matter whether the United States attempts
to stop the Soviet removal efforts or chooses not to stop
them in order to avoid more widespread conflict. As long as
force implies pressure not resisted because of a conscious
decision by the receiving state,3 0 6 only completely undetected removal efforts would not involve the use of force.
Since in regard to a space-based BMD system all removal efforts would probably be detected, there is thus little doubt
that "force" would be involved. Yet, it is unlikely that the
Soviets would ever undertake removal efforts during a period of crisis. With tensions already heightened, removal of
a ballistic missile defense system might be seen as the opening thrust of an offensive attack. Unless the Soviets were
convinced that the existing crisis was serious enough to push
the superpowers to nuclear war, and saw removal efforts as a
step towards improving their position at the onset of conflict,
removal efforts probably would be undertaken only during
times of relatively low tensions. As a result, the Soviet efforts at removal would provide a difficult case in terms of
current international law, for they probably would not be
clandestine and also probably would not occur at times when
Article 51 self-defense principles might be employed.
With regard to the exceptional principle of reprisal, the
threat to Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs posed by the three-tier
American BMD system would seem to provide sufficient necessity to warrant the use of military force to remove BMD
hardware whenever peaceful negotiations fail to result in removal. 30 7 Unless the BMD system is in fact incapable of destroying any Soviet missiles or warheads, it will pose a threat
to Soviet nuclear forces. Most analysts assume the BMD system will eventually have an overall strategic warhead de306. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
307. See supra note 278 on what the customary law meant by the requirement of necessity in the context of reprisals.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1985]

VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMEArTS

153

struction rate of between 50 and 99 percent.3 0 8 Since even
slight fluctuations in retaliatory capability may upset the strategic balance,3 0 9 removal might be justified whenever peaceful efforts prove unproductive.
With respect to anticipatory self-defense, Soviet efforts
to effect removal would present two important questions.
The first concerns whether a state must resort to effective
countermeasures in an attempt to ameliorate the threat of
attack before it can justify its use of force on grounds of anticipatory self-defense. It is well settled in some jurisdictions
that municipal law requires individuals to show that they
have "retreated to the wall" before their resort to force in
self-defense will be considered justifiable. Is such a requirement part of international law's test of anticipatory self-defense? International legal literature regarding anticipatory
self-defense does speak of the concept of "necessity." 3 10 Yet
there has been little effort to translate this concept into a requirement that effective countermeasures be used prior to
being able to rely justifiably on the use of force.
The second question raised by any Soviet removal effort
based on anticipatory self-defense concerns whether the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense can even be invoked as a
justification for using military force against a defensive system. This is a question of first impression. The traditional
international law of anticipatory self-defense was formulated
to permit a state facing an imminent threat of offensive attack to react before suffering the first blow. At the time it
was formulated, nearly 150 years ago, no one could have envisioned defensive systems with the capabilities of the "Star
Wars" system. The failure of traditional formulations of an308. See Burrows, supra note 1, at 852 (suggesting a penetration figure
converting to a 99 percent overall kill rate); Keeny, Reactions and Persprlives, in BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, supra note 1, at 411 (90 percent);
Payne & Gray, supra note 1, at 823 (85 percent at each level of the layered
system); Rathjens, Reactions and Perspectives, in BALLisTxc MIssiLE DEFENSE,
supra note 1, at 424 (50 to 90 percent).
309. See 1979 ACIS, supra note 4, at 119.
310. Cf S. MALLISON & W. MALLiSON, supra note 103, at 16-19 (suggesting force in self-defense is justified only if the "circumstances require"
it); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELiCIANO, supra note 23, at 218 (suggesting that

necessity is an imperative to the use of force and that its existence is to be
determined in total context); see also Schachter, Right of States, supra note
45, at 1635-37.
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ticipatory self-defense to address the issue of defensive systems is therefore quite understandable.
Requiring states to use effective countermeasures currently within their capability has a distinct appeal, since it
might reduce or eliminate the imminence of an attack without resort to military force. Secretary Webster's statement in
The Carolineincident that anticipatory self-defense is justified
only by an attack so imminent that it leaves "no moment for
deliberation,"31 1 supports such a requirement. If effective
countermeasures exist as an alternative to the use of force,
then a "moment for deliberation" is present. Furthermore,
in almost every conceivable instance, a state aware of some
development which will pose an imminent threat of attack in
the future cannot justify immediate recourse to armed force
if its technological sophistication enables it to fashion countermeasures which can neutralize the threat when the threat
eventually matures. Advance knowledge of a situation surely
gives the targeted state more than a "moment for deliberaseems to require it to develop appropriate
tion," and thus
12
responses.3
Since The Caroline standard requires peaceful settlement
whenever a threat of attack does not leave a "choice of
means," it should not be thought unusual that the "no moment for deliberation" standard directs internal or domestic
decisions by compelling the pursuit of alternatives to the immediate use of defensive force. The concept of "domestic
jurisdiction" reflected in Article 2(7)3'1 of the Charter is not
intended to limit the extent to which principles of interna311. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, supra note 56.
312. An example where force may in fact have been used far in advance
of an external threat being imminent is the Israeli air attack on the Tamuz
I nuclear reactor in Baghdad, Iraq. Whether the use of force was appropriate is an entirely distinct question. See generally Mallison & Mallison,
supra note 68; Note, National Self-Defense in InternationalLaw: An Emerging
Standardfor a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 187 (1984).
313. Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2, para. 7.
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tional law direct a state's internal decisions. Were this not
so, most principles of international law would be rendered
meaningless, since all are designed to establish parameters
on the exercise of state discretion.
To be sure, this is not to suggest that a state caught
without effective countermeasures, as a result of a conscious
decision to refrain from complying with the countermeasure
requirement, is estopped from invoking anticipatory self-defense when a threat becomes imminent. But a state would
not decide rationally upon such an imprudent course. Every
state wants to avoid the risks of conflict. The point made
here, however, is that a state able to choose between immediate resort to armed force and the development of countermeasures able to thwart a threat that time will cause to become imminent, is required to select the latter. This choice
is consistent with the policy against breaches of the peace
reflected in the Charter of the United Nations.
The important point about anticipatory self-defense
against defensive systems is that the basic objective behind
the right to preempt is, and has always been, to permit a
state to use reasonably proportionate armed force when necessary to forestall any military interference threatened by another state. That the customary international law standard
was formulated in a context of an imminent threat of an offensive attack is but reflective of the stage of technological
development extant at the time of The Caroline incident. The
future may be marked by defensive systems with staggering
capabilities, and as long as such systems may be used to further military ambitions there seems to be no reason to place
them beyond the scope of anticipatory self-defense.
Perhaps the dearest example in the nuclear age of a defensive system that should be considered as subject to justifiable preemption would be one able to envelop the possessor
with a shield impenetrable by an opponent's strategic weapons. To conclude otherwise would vest the possessor of
such a defensive system with the ability to disarm an opponent while retaining its own offensive forces. If the defensive
system does not permit such a completely neutralizing capability, the use of military force against it should be justifiable
on the basis of anticipatory self-defense in but one instance:
if the system enables the possessor to destroy a sufficient
number of strategic weapons so as to leave the opponent
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without the strategic power to inflict damage sufficient to deter the possessor of the defensive system from ever credibly
threatening the use of its own offensive weapons.
As discussed above, many argue that the United States'
current strategic vulnerability stems from the fact that a Soviet first-strike may destroy enough highly accurate American ICBMs to force the United States to capitulate rather
than launch a responsive strike against Soviet urban and industrial centers, thereby triggering a retaliatory strike and
full-fledged nuclear conflict.5 1 4 This line of reasoning suggests that defensive systems not able to envelop their possessor with completely impenetrable shields may still prove sufficient to give their possessor the capability to impose its will
on an opponent. Since the basic objective of anticipatory
self-defense is to permit states to use force to prevent this
from ever happening, defensive systems that deny an opponent effective use of enough offensive weapons to inflict the
kind of destruction able to deter threats from the possessor
of the defensive system would seem as susceptible to claims
of anticipatory self-defense as systems that create completely
impenetrable shields.
In light of the reasoning above, the Soviet Union would
seem hard pressed to make a case justifying the use of force
to remove the space-based BMD system currently receiving
consideration in the United States. The Soviet military could
easily put in place several countermeasures to the BMD system currently envisioned. These include: polishing missile
boosters to deflect the beams generated by directed-energy
weapons;3 1 5 adding ablative material to the boosters and
warheads to increase their ability to absorb heat;31 6 rotating
31 7
the boosters to reduce the dwell time of a weapon's beam;
shortening the firing time of missile boosters to minimize the
risk span during the boost phase;3 1 8 depressing the trajectory of missiles so as to fly under the space-based compo314. See Nitze, supra note 112, at 227.
315. C. GRAY, supra note 1, at 64.
316. Payne & Gray, supra note 1, at 835.
317. Id.
318. See Letters to the Editor, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1985, at 27, col. 1;
Bienen & Ostriker, 'Star Wars'-Costly, Futile, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1985, at 4,
col. 1.
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nents of the BMD system;3 19 using chaff or dummy warheads
to increase the number of targets for the mid-course and terminal phases;3 20 and deploying space mines3 2 1 or earthbased lasers designed to destroy the space-based components of the BMD system in the moments preceding the out3 22
break of war.
Moreover, even if countermeasures did not exist or
could not be developed in time, it seems doubtful that the
effectiveness of the American BMD system would be sufficient to justify a Soviet use of military force to effect removal.
Analysts do not suggest that the system will be completely
impenetrable 3 23 And every one-tenth of one percent results
in leakage of ten strategic warheads. Even if the BMD system
were completely effective, American military specialists
would still have to contend with low-altitude nuclear delivery
systems such as air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The
Soviets have thousands of these missiles, which can be
launched from every direction and can strike targets with
32 4
pinpoint accuracy from altitudes of 100 feet to 600 miles.
These missiles alone, given their destructive capability, may
deter the United States from coercing the Soviets to conform
to certain American dictates or suffer an offensive strike.
B. Advanced ASW: A Possible American Case for Anticipatory
Use of Force
What if the Soviet Union were to emplace anti-submarine warfare (ASW) devices on the U.S. continental shelf?.
The Soviet Union may have a real interest in clandestinely
deploying such devices off the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf
coasts of the United States3 2 5 in order to jeopardize as many
of the United States' strategic forces as possible.3 2 6 Such a
deployment might justify the anticipatory use of force by the
United States. To understand this, an examination of the
319.
320.
321.
322.

See C. GRAY,supra note 1, at 65.
Andelman, supra note 130, at 97.
See generally C. GRAY, supra note 1, at 64-69.
Weiner, supra note 1, at 96.

323. See supra note 308.

324. Burrows, supra note 1, at 850.
325. See R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5.
326. Some argue the Soviets are seeking a war-winning capability. See
Soviets Confident of Nuclear fictory?, Tulsa World, Nov. 4, 1981, at A5, col. 2.
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current configuration of strategic nuclear weaponry is important.
1.

The Importance of American SSBNs

The Soviet and American strategic nuclear arsenals are
32 7
estimated to hold approximately 10,000 warheads each.
The superpowers' basing preferences, however, differ markedly. The United States has deployed slightly more than fifty
percent of its strategic warheads on SLBMs. 328 Less than
thirty percent of the United States' strategic warheads are
carried on long-range bombers, and approximately twenty
percent on ICBMs.3 2 9 In contrast, the Soviets have deployed
slightly more than seventy percent of their strategic warheads on land-based ICBMs. 330 Less than twenty percent of
Soviet warheads are on SLBMs, and less than ten percent on
33
bombers. '
The high percentage of Soviet warheads based on
ICBMs has contributed to the vulnerability of the United
States' ICBM force.3 32 Many strategic theorists suggest that
the destructive power and accuracy of the Soviet ICBMs,
when combined with the Soviet preference for land-based
missiles, could result in the loss of as much as ninety percent
of the United States' ICBM force in a Soviet first-strike. 3 "3
Thus, the critical importance to the United States of its
SLBMs and the nuclear powered submarines that carry them
is clear. The difficulty the United States' bomber force might
encounter in getting airborne 3 4 and then attempting to penetrate Soviet air space,3 3 5 further heightens the importance
327. Frye, Strategic Build-Down: A Context for Restraint, 62
293, 296 (1983-1984).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.

FOREIGN AFF.

333. Reflections on the Quarter,supra note 117, at 253.

334. See 1979 ACIS, supra note 4, at 69 (suggesting that only about 30%
of the United States bomber force would survive a Soviet surprise attack).
335. See Rummel, Will the Soviet Union Soon Have a First-Strike Capability?,

20 ORBIS: J. WORLD AFF. 579, 584-86 (1976) (suggesting that United
States bombers may not be able to penetrate Soviet airspace). Notwithstanding difficulties in penetration, cruise missiles may give the United
States the ability to strike hardened Soviet targets, such as ICBM silos, see
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of American SLBMs.
The roughly 5,000336 strategic nuclear warheads on the

United States' SLBM force are carried by a fleet of thirtythree ballistic missile launching nuclear powered submarines
(SSBNs).3 3 7 Thirty-one of these are Poseidon SSBNs armed
with sixteen missiles apiece,3 3 8 and two are Ohio-class Trident SSBNs33 9 able to fire twenty-four missiles apiece.3'l0
The Trident SSBNs carry Trident I (G-4)missiles which have
eight warheads each3 4 1 and a range of approximately 4,000
nautical miles.3 4 2 Twelve of the thirty-one Poseidon SSBNs
3
have been retro-fitted to carry Trident I (C-4) missiles. 43
The remaining nineteen Poseidons carry the Poseidon C-3
missile, 344 which has ten warheads3 45 and a range of approximately 2,500 nautical miles.3 4 6 Since approximately fifty-five
percent of the United States' SSBNs are out of port at any
one time,3 4 7 roughly 2,400 of the strategic nuclear warheads
deliverable by its SLBMs would be exposed to any risks created by a Soviet ASW system deployed on America's continental shelf. Of that number, only those atop Trident I (C-4)
missiles would have a chance of hitting from home-port anything more than the northeasternmost tip of Siberia.348 The
Vershbow, The Cruise Missile: The End of Arms Control?, 55 FoREIGN AFF.
133, 137 (1976), from locations beyond the range of Soviet air defenses.
(Since the bombers which carry cruise missiles may be significantly more
vulnerable than long-range ballistic missiles, see 1979 ACIS,supra note 4.
at 67-69, the United States should not rely too heavily on air-launched
cruise missiles to deter a Soviet first-strike threat.)
336. One source lists the precise figure at 4,960. See STOCKHOLt INtL
PEACE RESEARCH INST., 1983 Y.B. WoRLD ARMAtENTs & DISAR1tAMENT 48,
table 3.1 [hereinafter cited as SIPRI 1983].
337. Id at 53.

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id
Id
Id
Idoat 48, table 3.1.
1980 ACIS,supra note 4, at 46.
SIPRI 1983, supra note 336, at 53.
Id
Id at 48, table 3.1.
346. See Lindsey, The Future of Anti-Submarine Warfare and its Inpact on Naval Activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic Regions, in NEW STRATEGic FAcTORS IN THE NORTH Am. nc 139, 150 (C. Bertram &J. Hoist eds. 1977).
347. 1979 ACIS,supra note 4, at 104.
348. See R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5.
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heavily populated and industrialized south and southwestern
portions of the Soviet Union lie beyond the range of any
3 49
American SLBMs launched from home-port.
International law may authorize the use of force to remove a Soviet ASW system emplaced on America's continental shelf without demanding that all or a substantial part of
all of the three legs of the United States' strategic triad be
subject to destruction as a result. If the right of reprisal exists under contemporary international law, the United States
need show only that necessity requires that the threatening
system be removed. Although the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense is considerably more stringent than the reprisal
standard, the United States would only need to show that the
Soviet ASW system posed an imminent threat of attack to
justify removal efforts. As a prelude to a discussion of
whether ASW deployment would be sufficient to warrant invocation by the United States of the rights of reprisal or anticipatory self-defense, an examination of current ASW detection and weapons technology is set forth below.
2.

Advanced ASW Technology

The most advanced and modern ASW systems are those
possessed by the United States.3 5 0 Nevertheless, it would be
unrealistic to think that the Soviets will be unable to match
the U.S. systems after a reasonable period of intense research and development. 3 5 ' Thus, caution seems to dictate
that one should assume that whatever advanced technology
now exists is the technology the Soviets would employ in
putting their ASW system in place.
Several kinds of detection devices would likely make up
an integral part of a Soviet ASW system, including: low-light
level television, 35 2 infra-red line scan, 3 53 radar sensor, 3 5"
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. The Soviets apparently seek major breakthroughs rather than incremental advances in almost all areas of military technology. For discussion on U.S. apprehensions regarding a Soviet ASW system, see 1979
ACIS, supra note 4, at 106.
352. Id. at 108; SIPRI 1974, supra note 4, at 308, 310.
353. 1979 ACIS, supra note 4, at 106.
354. SIPRI 1974, supra note 4, at 308.
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magnetic anomaly detection,3 5 5 active and passive sonobuoy, 35 6 and dipping sonar.35 7 Although a rapidly deployable moored surveillance system is currently being developed, the basic seabed-based listening system at the present
time is the acoustic detection array.3 5 8 The Soviets could
conceivably construct a series of linked self-powered detec355. Id. at 309, 313.
356. Id at 308-10, 313.
357. Dipping sonar is carried by the Sea King SH-3 series helicopter. See
K. Tsipis, supra note 4, at 24-25 & app. 1, table 1, A(3).
358. This system functions by means of detectable sound emitted or reflected by submarines. Passive arrays are those which simply detect sound
emissions; they have been estimated to pick up sound generated by the
cavitation and turbulence of a submarine as far away as 100 miles. See
Brown, Military Uses of the Ocean Floor, in PACEM IN MARiBUS 285, 288 (E.
Borgesse ed. 1972). Some authorities, however, set the range of detected
sound at 100 kilometers. See SIPRI 1974, supra note 4, at 307. The passive
device consists of hyper-sensitive hydrophones or listening instruments
which detect sound emissions generated by moving vessels, and then relay
the detected emissions to an awaiting computer analysis unit which distinguishes the ambient ocean noise from meaningful signals and attempts to
identify the nature of the moving object. See SIPRI 1974, supra note 4, at
316-17.
Arrays which detect reflected sound are termed active systems. Active
arrays are equipped with electromechanical generators, known as transducers, which propagate sound waves, and hydrophones, which listen to
detect any reflection of the sound waves, processing all information in a
manner similar to that used by the passive system. Active arrays are estimated to have a range of about fifty miles. See Brown, supra, at 287. Unlike passive systems, active systems can compute the location of detected
objects. Processing units accomplish this by triangulation and by measuring the time it takes for sound pulses to return to the hydrophones.
The principal acoustic detection arrays presently employed are the
Sonar Surveillance System (SOSUS), see generally K. TsPIS, supra note 4, at
29-30; the Azores Fixed Acoustic Range (AFAR), see id. at 30 & app. 1,
table 1, A(5); and Sea Spider, see id. at app. 1, table 1, A(5).
The entire SOSUS system consists of several individual systems, each
designed to monitor specific areas of ocean space. "Caesar," the original
component of SOSUS, is emplaced on the continental shelfalong the castem seaboard. See id. A more advanced version, "Colossus," is located on
the Pacific shelf off the west coast. See SIPRI 1974, supra note 4, at 317.
"Barrier" and "Bronco," systems similar to those scanning the two seaboards, are believed to be deployed beyond the coasts of the United
States' allies. See K. TsiPis, supra note 4, at app. 1, table 1, A(5).
AFAR consists of several sonars mounted on top of three or more
130-meter high towers, each spaced thirty-five kilometers apart and submerged off the southernmost islands of the Azores group in water 300 to
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tion arrays, which might permit continual surveillance of
conventional and nuclear powered submarines located any3 59

where on the United States' continental shelf
Detection is but one part of an ASW system; a second
critical component is a complementary weapons system.
The basic weapons systems now in operation include depth
charges, antisubmarine rockets, antisubmarine torpedoes,
submersible antisubmarine mines, and Captor (encapsulated
torpedo).3 60 While the exact capabilities of these weapons
are classified, reports suggest that they may be quite astounding.3

61

Many of the depth charges, rockets, and torpe-

does are, or are capable of being, armed with nuclear explosive devices.3 62 Some have target ranges in the area 36of3
50,000 meters and diving abilities of up to 1,000 meters.
The seabed-based weapons now most often in use, submersible antisubmarine mines and encapsulated torpedoes,
have less impressive capabilities. The submersible mine has
a range limitation of approximately thirty fathoms.3 64 It is
5 or
activated by either fluctuations in hydrostatic pressure 36
changes in surrounding magnetic or acoustic energy
levels.3 66 Captor is a new and sophisticated form of mag600 meters deep. Its principal task is to keep track of submarines entering
and leaving the Mediterranean.
Sea Spider is a much more ambitious system. It is basically a passive
acoustic submarine detection unit composed of a single hydrophonic listening device three meters in diameter and anchored by three cables at a
depth of approximately 5,000 meters. The entire unit is reported to be
powered by a nuclear battery and stationed a few hundred miles north of
Hawaii. In 1969 the Navy attempted unsuccessfully to install such a system. Reports that it later succeeded have not been confirmed.
359. See R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5.
360. K. Tsipis, supra note 4, at 48, app. 1, table 2.
361. Id.
362. See Zedalis, Military Uses of Ocean Space, supra note 6, at 590 n. 70-72.
363. See Department of Defense Authorizationfor Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year
1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Research and Development of the Senate
Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3102-06 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as 1980 DOD Hearings].
364. Brown, supra note 358, at 289.
365. Depression mines rest on, or are secured to, the sea floor. Unlike
physical contact mines which explode upon impact, depression mines depend on fluctuations in the hydrostatic pressure.
366. Magnetic acoustic mines also rest on, or are secured to, the sea
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netic/acoustic submersible antisubmarine mine.3 67 Various
technological innovations have been integrated to give it the
ability to detect an enemy submarine, release itself from a
mooring capsule, and then propel itself to its targeted destination. It is believed that Captor may be deployed by airplane, surface ship, or submarine.3 68 Captor's sensor acquisition radius, however, is only about one kilometer.3 69 Nevertheless, this self-activated antisubmarine weapon does
pose a threat to conventional and nuclear powered submarines.
3.

Assessment

Undoubtedly, the United States would not tolerate the
presence on its continental shelf of Soviet detection devices
or seabed-based weapons similar to those described
above.370 Since these objects would lie defenseless below
the opaque cover of the ocean, removal would most likely be
undertaken anytime the effort could be assured of escaping
detection. If one accepts the idea that such removal does not
involve the use of force, the United States would not need to
rely on the rights of reprisal or anticipatory self-defense to
justify its actions. Even where likely to meet with Soviet
resistance, removal may nevertheless be advised if U.S. decisionmakers conclude that U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations could withstand the strains removal might produce.
If, on the other hand, U.S. decisionmakers determine
that U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations are already overburdened by
other crises, and it is concluded that removal of Soviet ASW
devices and weapons may push the superpowers to the
breaking point, the decisionmakers would probably advise
against removal. The only case of this sort in which removal
might be advised would involve the conclusion that the existing crises already held out the possibility of conflict. In
floor. Changes in the surrounding magnetic or acoustic energy levels activate them.
367. See 1979 ACIS, supra note 4, at 108.
368. See 1980 DOD Hearings, supra note 363, at 311.
369. See K. Tsipis, supra note 4, at 33.
370. M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 5, at 724. The United
States' involvement in the Bay of Pigs invasion and the quarantine of Cuba
also demonstrate U.S. intolerance to threats posed dose to national borders.
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that case, the rationale for removal would be to assure that
the United States entered the inevitable conflict with an improved military position.
Assuming the existence of a right of reprisal, a refusal by
the Soviet Union to remove a Soviet ASW system from the
United States' continental shelf would probably constitute
"necessity" sufficient to permit the use of force in removal
efforts by the United States. Many analysts believe that the
strategic balance is sensitive to the slightest variations in
force levels caused by weapons able to threaten the retaliatory capability of an opponent 5s7 1 A Soviet ASW system as
described above could make some American SSBNs within
home-port waters vulnerable to a surprise attack. The fact of
Soviet knowledge of the location of a significant number of
American SSBNs poses a direct threat in its own right.3 72
Although the range limitations of the seabed-based weapons
would prevent them from destroying SSBNs while in port,
Soviet vessels located outside American territorial waters
and armed with long-range antisubmarine rockets and torpedoes would not be so constrained. Using the location information supplied by ASW detection devices, such weapons
could be targeted to destroy American SSBNs in port. If the
American SSBNs attempted to cross the United States' continental shelf to reach launch locations in the Atlantic, Pacific,
and Indian Oceans, the seabed-based weapons of the ASW
system would pose a direct threat.
Under the law of anticipatory self-defense, the United
States would be required to demonstrate that a Soviet ASW
system posed an imminent threat of attack, leaving "no moment for deliberation."3 7 3 In the absence of this, the use of
force to effect removal would not be justified. A showing of
this sort would be difficult to make during periods of relative
tranquility. Scholars have suggested that a preemptive strike
against Soviet ICBMs might be justified only during the minutes immediately prior to an incontrovertibly demonstrated

371. 1979 ACIS,supra note 4, at 108.
372. See R. ALDRIDGE, supra note 106, at 51 (quoting the Director of the
Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)).
373. See Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, supra note 56.
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launch of those Soviet missiles.3 7 4 Thus, how could the
United States maintain credibly that a Soviet ASW system
poses an imminent threat of attack justifying the use of force
to effect removal? The threat of destruction from an ASW
system is much more speculative than that from ICBMs.
That removal may nonetheless be advised as a matter of military policy in such situations suggests an inconsistency between the current legal standards governing anticipatory
self-defense and expected state behavior.
By contrast, anticipatory self-defense may justify removal by force when U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations are marked by
tension and animosity. As discussed above, Soviet knowledge of SSBN locations obtained by ASW detection devices
may pose an imminent threat of attack to the United States
when that knowledge is relayed to armed Soviet vessels.
Therefore, unless effective countermeasures are in place, anticipatory self-defense would seem to justify U.S. efforts to
remove the ASW devices. From a practical vantage point,
however, removal efforts would likely intensify already
strained relations between the superpowers, and might,
therefore, be unwise.
That a threat of attack is not "imminent" when the superpower relationship is not burdened by other crises should
not be seen as paradoxical. The mere deployment of a Soviet ASW system, even if violative of international law, does
not necessarily create sufficiently grave concerns to warrant
invocation of anticipatory self-defense. Soviet SSBNs armed
with nuclear missiles navigate just off the United States'
coasts all the time. The presence of these vessels poses a far
greater threat to the United States than an ASW system
does.3 75 Were they to unleash their fury, the SSBNs could
374. Cf. L. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 142-45; J.
note 23, at 8-9.

STONE, OF LAW,

supra

375. See R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5. This Article
indicates that ballistic missile launching submarines are relatively invulnerable and, because of their less accurate guidance systems, incapable of
being used as first-strike weapons. Thus, SSBNs serve to strengthen state
security. To the extent that ASW weapons and devices threaten SSBNs,
they threaten stability. As a result, it is not incongruous to view ASW activities as a greater threat than SSBN activity. International law of the sea
contains prescriptions reflecting the relative desirability of each of these
two uses. Id.
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deliver well over 100 nuclear warheads with pinpoint accuracy, killing millions and inflicting widespread devastation
on the U.S. industrial complex.3 7 6 Yet few would suggest
that the United States would be justified in striking those
submarines during a relatively tranquil period. Thus, in the
absence of tensions creating a reasonable apprehension of
the imminence of an attack guided and controlled by a Soviet
ASW system, the violation of international law arising from
the deployment of such a system would likely not be
redressable by force.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This Article has not considered whether the principle of
military necessity reflected in the "laws of war," as opposed
to the principles of reprisal or anticipatory self-defense,
which regulate the use of force during times governed by the
"laws of peace," more appropriately fits the current state of
relations between the superpowers.3 7 7 Continuing ideological hostility, astronomical defense budgets which greatly outstrip those of earlier wartime eras, and occasional military
confrontation through surrogates lend a logical appeal to
claims of this sort. Similarly, this Article has not discussed
the jurisprudential questions connected with prescriptions
designed to regulate the behavior of members of the world
community. The absence of centralized sanctioning for violations of international rules raises this issue whenever the
topic of international "law" is addressed. Any truly comprehensive study of the topic dealt with herein would require
equal attention to both of these important items.
The objective of this Article has been to consider the
376. See Weinland, The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in the North ,tlantic, in NEW STRATEGIC FACTORS IN THE NORTH ATANImc 55, 62 (C. Betram
&J. Hoist eds. 1977) (3-5 Delta class SSBNs on patrol in Atlantic at any
one time); R. Zedalis, Foreign State Military Use, supra note 5, at nn.44559 (number of warheads Delta-class submarines can deliver). Notice that
no reference has been made to the destructive capability of Soviet SSBNs
in the Pacific.
377. Cf Blum, The Beirut Raid andthe InternationalDouble Standard: A Reply
to ProfessorRichardA. Falk, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 72, 76-79 (1970) (regarding
Israel's 1968 raid on the Beirut Airport, the author notes a distinction between the principle of military necessity and those governing reprisal and
anticipatory self-defense).
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remedies available under international law for violations of
arms control agreements. The analysis has focused on the
"Star Wars" space-based BMD system and a continental
shelf-based advanced ASW network. The Article has argued

that, with one possible exception,378 a state can justify its use
of force to end military uses violative of various international
conventions only by means of the exceptional principles.
The customary right of reprisal could provide justification for the removal of a space-based BMD system or a shelfbased ASW system. Reprisal, however, is no longer recognized as a right under contemporary international law.
Nonetheless, the policy reasons supporting this interpretation of the status of the law have not been adequately developed.
Anticipatory self-defense remains as valid an alternative
justification now as it was before the adoption of the United
Nations Charter. Support for the right can be found in both
sound legal and policy bases. The standard of imminent
threat of attack, leaving "no moment for deliberation," was
formulated during a period when no one could have envisioned defensive systems able to achieve the same objectives
as offensive weapons. Moreover, given the language used to
express the standard, the standard fixes a considerable burden on a state seeking to demonstrate legitimate reliance on
the right. Any Soviet effort to prevent deployment of an
American space-based BMD system would raise novel and
important questions that would mark the course of future international law.
Ultimately, Soviet efforts to prevent deployment of an
American space-based BMD system seem unable to satisfy
the rigorous anticipatory self-defense standard. American
efforts to remove a Soviet ASW network based on the United
States' continental shelf, on the other hand, may meet the
current anticipatory self-defense standard, but only during
times of intense crisis. Even then, there are probably few instances when military decisionmakers would actually advise
removal.

378. This possible exception is the clandestine removal of objects left
unprotected by the deploying state.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

